Will Israel’s rocket defense system help or hurt the conflict?

By David Lehrer

Those of us who grew up in the United States in the 1960s may remember that period as one of naïve optimism overshadowed by apocalyptic terror.  We were terrified of the possibility that nuclear missiles from the USSR would be launched at us but naïvely believed that if we just crouched down under our school desks and held our heads between our hands we would be safe.

We lived in a MAD, mad world, where MAD stood for Mutual Assured Destruction, the military doctrine and foreign policy that guided the strategic relationship between the two superpowers.  The doctrine held that if both sides were convinced that a nuclear war, no matter who started it, would end in the utter annihilation of both sides, no one would launch a first strike. This doctrine did not prevent a nuclear arms race nor did it put an end to conventional warfare (in fact the opposite is true) but after all, we are still here. The belief in this doctrine was so strong that in 1972, the United States and the USSR signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which prevented both sides from developing technology that could shoot down the other side’s incoming nuclear warhead.

This past week’s performance of Iron Dome, the system that prevented rockets launched in Gaza from landing on population centers in Israel was a phenomenal success for the IDF and Israeli technology.  I want to praise the politicians who made the decision to install the Iron Dome and the military leaders and engineers who were involved in its implementation.  Lives were saved this week.  We are still a long way from complete protection against rockets and missiles fired on us by our neighbors and complete coverage may in fact never be achieved.

However, it is not too early to ask ourselves how this new technology may affect the actions of the actors in the region.  Does it reduce or increase the chance of an eruption of violence and bloodshed?  Looking back at the conflict between the two superpowers during the 1960s and 70s, it was technology that brought us to the brink of nuclear war.   At first glance, there seems to be little comparison between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War, other than the fact that technology can determine strategy.

Thanks to Iron Dome, Israeli lives are less vulnerable to physical harm by rockets launched from Gaza. Does that mean Israeli leaders will now react less forcefully to rocket attacks and that they will be more thoughtful and rational about when and how to use military force against the terror organizations operating from Gaza?  Or will Israeli leaders feel they can carry out assassinations in Gaza with impunity – and therefore be quicker on the trigger, knowing that Israeli citizens are now safe from reprisal rocket attacks.

How will the Palestinians respond to this new technology?  Do Israel’s political and military leaders assume Hamas and the other resistance organizations will now react “rationally,” for example: “Israel is now protected from our rockets, so why bother launching them? It’s time to recognize Israel and talk peace.”  Or will Israel’s apparent invincibility simply motivate Palestinian resistance leaders in Gaza to find another way to attack Israel or defeat Iron Dome itself?

Only time will tell what impact the success of Iron Dome will have on decisions made by leaders in the region.  What was it that prevented the world from annihilating itself during the Cold War? Rational decisions made by rational leaders who understood that it was in their own county’s best interest not to launch a nuclear attack.

Unfortunately, rationality is a very scarce resource in the Middle East, whose leader’s often seem motivated more by ideology and passion than by common sense and rational thinking. So here is a list of rational thoughts that I hope Israeli leaders keep in mind this week while they are opening up the champagne to celebrate the victory of Iron Dome.  I call it my “Never try to invade Russia in the winter” list:

 

  • Never underestimate the ability of a small group of ideologically motivated people willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause, to defeat modern technology (9/11 should have taught us this)
  • Military action is not a substitute for diplomacy (most military leaders would agree)
  • Sometimes the best course of action is inaction (thank you Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir for teaching us this lesson)
  • An end to the occupation, a peace agreement and healthy, vibrant economic, social and cultural relations between Israel and Palestine would be a much more effective Iron Dome than anything the generals and the engineers can ever come up with.

David Lehrer is the Executive Director of the Arava Institute, from which he is currently on sabbatical. This article represents his views only, and not those of the Arava Institute.