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Israel's Ashkenazi elites won't let Mizrahim lead the left

More than 70 years after Israel was founded, the old Ashkenazi guard of the Israeli left is still doing everything in its power to prevent Mizrahim and other oppressed groups from taking the reins.

By Lev Grinberg

Meretz Chairman Nitzan Horowitz (right), Former Israeli Prime Minister and leader of Israel Democratic Party Ehud Barak (center) and Israeli MK Stav Shaffir seen during a Democratic Union election event in Tel Aviv, July 30, 2019. (Photo by Flash90)

Meretz Chairman Nitzan Horowitz (right), Former Israeli Prime Minister and leader of Israel Democratic Party Ehud Barak (center) and Israeli MK Stav Shaffir seen during a Democratic Union election event in Tel Aviv, July 30, 2019. (Photo by Flash90)

Give or take a few seats, it seems things will remain much as they were following Election Day on Tuesday, with the right- and left-wing blocs winning a near-identical amount of Knesset seats as they did in the last elections. And yet, despite what looks to be a similar outcome, it is worth examining the shift that has taken place inside what is commonly referred to as the Israeli left over the last few months.

Following the results of the last elections held in April, some of the smaller parties teetering on the brink of extinction sought to save themselves by joining forces with the larger parties. Moshe Kahlon’s centrist Kulanu party became part of Likud, the New Right party morphed into the Union of Right-Wing Parties, the Arab Balad-Ta’al and Hadash-Ra’am parties resuscitated the Joint List, Labor joined up with Orly Levy’s Gesher party (which did not pass the election threshold the last time around), and the left-wing Meretz teamed up with Ehud Barak and Stav Shaffir to form the Democratic Union.

On the center-left, these attempts at survival have led to long-simmering tensions between the old elites and those who want to represent long-oppressed communities in Israel, primarily Mizrahi Israelis.

The fall of the Ashkenazi elite

Following the implosion of the Oslo Accords in 2001, famed Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling published a short book titled “The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony,” detailing the downfall of the Ashkenazi secular elite that had ruled Israel since the first days of the state.

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Kimmerling defined the founders of the pre-state Zionist institutions and later on the State of Israel as secular, veteran, Ashkenazi, socialist, and nationalist. This group molded the collective Israeli identity in their image (European, secular and modern), established the ruling Mapai party, controlled the economy, and dominated Israeli culture. All other groups that made up Israeli society were subjugated by this elite, including Arab citizens and ultra-Orthodox Jews.

Jewish immigrants from Arab countries were forced into an Israeli “melting pot,” which compelled them to ditch their Arab culture in order to integrate into society, while being sent to far-flung, undeveloped areas of the new state where they replaced the Palestinians expelled during the 1948 war.

According to Kimmerling, following Oslo, Israeli identity broke down into seven communities: secular Ashkenazim, religious-Zionists, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, Mizrahim (Jews from Arab and Muslim countries), Jews from the former Soviet Union, Arabs, and Ethiopians. Meanwhile, the end of secular-Western dominance over Israeli identity was the result of three different processes that had taken shape in Israel over the last 50 years. Chief among them was the emergence of a messianic, settler religious-Zionism that replaced the historical role of the Labor movement as the movement that sought to settle the entirety of Land of Israel. As opposed to Labor’s secular settler ideology, the religious-Zionists developed an alternative strategy for the establishment of a settler society steeped in a religious-messianic ethos.

Rabbi Moshe Levinger (L), settler leader Hanan Porat (R) and fellow activists celeberate the government's decision to allow settlers to establish a settlement near the Palestinian village of Sebastia in the West Bank, August 12, 1975. (Moshe Milner)

Rabbi Moshe Levinger (L), settler leader Hanan Porat (R) and fellow activists celebrate the government’s decision to allow settlers to establish a settlement near the Palestinian village of Sebastia in the West Bank, August 12, 1975. (Moshe Milner)

The second change was the mass immigration of Jews from the former USSR in the early 1990s. Unlike immigrants from Arab countries, these new immigrants were accepted into Israeli society without being tossed into the melting pot and forced to shed the culture of their home countries.

The final change was the attempt by Mizrahim to enter the political arena, which began in earnest in 1984 and culminated with 17 Knesset seats for the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox Shas party in the 1999 elections.

The dissolution of an Israeli collective identity in the ’90s was seen by many as the “end of Zionist ideology.” This lead to the strengthening of so-called “sectorial parties,” which represented the interests of various groups in Israeli society, while the power of larger parties such as Labor and Likud began to dwindle.

The power of the tribe

In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin defeated his contender Shimon Peres by one seat (48-47) in an election cycle that, for the first time in Israeli history, saw the establishment of a left-right tribal dichotomy. Tribalism allows parties to recruit supporters based on a sentiment of belonging to “people like us,” all while sowing hatred for and fear of members of the other tribe. It is also very beneficial to political parties, as it allows them to evade substantive policy debates while re-framing the election as a battle of “us versus them.” It worked in 1981: leftists hated Begin and rightists hated Peres.

P.M. MENACHEM BEGIN (R) AND PRES. ANWAR SADAT (L) SHAKING HANDS AT FESTIVE DINNER IN THE TENT NEAR THE WHITE HOUSE. PRES. JIMMY CARTER (CENTER). Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (right) shakes hands with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left) during a dinner hosted by U.S. President Jimmy Carter (center) at the White House, March 26, 1979. (Ya'acov Sa'ar/GPO)

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (right) shakes hands with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left) during a dinner hosted by U.S. President Jimmy Carter (center) at the White House, March 26, 1979. (Ya’acov Sa’ar/GPO)

Both the left and right have a mythical self-image that is inconsistent with the actual policies of the parties that represent them. The left views itself as a peacemaker, despite the fact that Mapai (the predecessor of the Labor Party) and its political partners were the ones who implemented the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights and helped launch the settlement enterprise.

Meanwhile, the right views itself as the protector of the entire Land of Israel, even though it was Begin who made peace with Egypt; withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and dismantled the settlements there; recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and agreed to establish autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a period of five years (the agreement was not realized at the time, although it did serve as the basis for Yitzhak Rabin’s proposals to Yasser Arafat during the Oslo era).

As opposed to Kimmerling, I believe the Oslo Accords were the defining moment that tore apart a collective Israeli identity, which until then revolved around compulsory military service and viewing the Palestinians as a common enemy — the glue that held together the various components of Israeli society. The moment Arafat and Rabin shook hands on the White House lawn, Israeli identity began to splinter, along with the traditional left-right divide.

Parties for everyone — except Mizrahim

The question of Mizrahi representation has been at the forefront of the various election cycles in Israeli history. In 1999, Shas jumped from 10 Knesset seats to 17, while a crop of new Mizrahi leaders began to emerge. Yet those Mizrahi politicians did not form alliances with one another, opting instead to join parties that had been established by Ashkenazim. Mizrahi identity, it turned out, was the only one among many that was seen as illegitimate. This was a time when Russian, ultra-Orthodox, Arab, and religious parties abounded. The Mizrahim, however, were severely criticized whenever their representatives stepped out of line.

Every Mizrahi leader knows that teaming up with another Mizrahi politician means certain political death. This has become evident in last few months, after the left-wing Meretz party was praised for allying itself with hawkish former Prime Minister Ehud Barak — despite the huge ideological gaps between the two.

Meanwhile the union between Labor leader Amir Peretz (who is of Moroccan descent) and Orly Levy, a former member of Knesset, with Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu who focuses on social issues like public housing, was roundly condemned across the left. Peretz’s decision to choose Levy, a Mizrahi woman, over Meretz (a party dominated by secular Ashkenazim) was too much for the left-wing tribe. The moment he tried to break with the traditional tribal left-right discourse, Peretz was accused of secretly plotting to join a Netanyahu-led coalition on the day after the election.

Co-chairmen of the Labor-Gesher party, Amir Peretz and Orly Levy, at an election event in Tel Aviv on September 15, 2019. (Roy Alima/Flash90)

Co-chairs of the Labor-Gesher party, Amir Peretz and Orly Levy, at an election event in Tel Aviv on September 15, 2019. (Roy Alima/Flash90)

The lack of any policy debate also explains how both the left and right can continue to appeal to tribalism in order to mobilize voters. Mizrahi identity is seen as a threat to Ashkenazi hegemony precisely because it can serve as a more accepting collective identity than both the secular Israeli identity offered by the left and the nationalistic identity of the right. Mizrahi identity, then, is capable of holding what are perceived as contradictory terms, including Arab identity and Jewish identity, religion and secularism, modernity and tradition. And in doing so, it becomes an inclusive alternative identity for all Israelis. It is also the reason Mizrahi leaders are under unprecedented attack by members of the Ashkenazi elite.

In this context, Avigdor Liberman, who has historically represented Russian-speakers in Israel, has turned into a life preserver that could save the elites from their demise. After rebuffing Netanyahu’s offer to join the ruling coalition following the last elections, Liberman has become a kingmaker who will be able to decide this election’s outcome. This is why much of the left is pinning its hopes on him.

The Russian vote was decisive in deciding elections in the ’90s, but with the resumption of hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians, Russian speakers sided firmly with Likud. Liberman was the first politician to turn hatred of Arabs into a central tool for mobilizing voters in the 2009 elections. It was that hate and incitement that won him 14 seats.

Yisrael Beiteinu Chairman Avigdor Liberman during an event in Tel Aviv, March 2, 2019. (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90)

Yisrael Beitenu Chairman Avigdor Liberman during an event in Tel Aviv, March 2, 2019. (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90)

Since then, however, Netanyahu has learned to use anti-Arab racism far better than Liberman, forcing the latter to search for a new kind of hatred that could mobilize voters. He found it in demonizing ultra-Orthodox Jews — a defining feature of the tribal left — which will likely bring him more Knesset seats than the five he won last April. By demanding the establishment of a secular unity government with Likud and the centrist Blue and White, Liberman hopes to elevate Russian-speakers to the same status as that of the veteran Ashkenazi elites.

But tribalism is not a political position — it is a form of political mobilization that is premised on animosity. If Liberman is able to form a secular unity government, it will not only be conservative and capitalistic coalition — it will also reaffirm the legitimacy of Israel’s military control over the Palestinians in the occupied territories. All it will take is for Netanyahu’s right-wing-religious-Haredi bloc to receive fewer than 61 votes on Tuesday.

And while there is an alternative to Liberman’s secular coalition, it is unlikely that the Ashkenazi elites will support it: a coalition that seeks to connect the older elites with groups that were subjugated by those very same elites, including Mizrahim, the ultra-Orthodox, and Palestinian citizens. Yitzhak Rabin was murdered for attempting to create these alliances, and there has never been a leadership brave enough to take the risk since.

This is not a question of mathematics and Knesset seats, but rather of political will. Amir Peretz was violently silenced by the tribal left after explicitly supporting this alternative, Rabin-esque vision. After all, inclusion for other identities has never been part of the center-left’s toolkit when it came to mobilizing voters. Maybe after these elections, the tribe will rethink its strategy.

Professor Lev Grinberg is a political sociologist, founding chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Ben Gurion University, and current visiting professor at the Sociology Department in Dartmouth College.
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    COMMENTS

    1. I wouldn’t know where to start with this article. It encompasses all the faults and failings of identity politics. It conveniently misses out on the one identity that counts – that of the oppressed Palestinians.

      The Misrahi bought their place in the sun by joining the Zionist collective but Zionism as a concept is also missing from this nonsense.

      Grinberg speaks of ‘secular Israeli identity offered by the left and the nationalistic identity of the right.’ THis is a false counterposition. Firstly ‘secular’ Zionism is no such thing as it rests on the god given land of Israel – in other words secular Zionism has ALWAYS made concessions to the religious. That began when Ben Gurion in 1949 eschewed a coalition with Mapam, giving the government an absolute majority in favour of an alliance with the religious Zionists.

      Secondly it is wrong because the nationalism of the Right is merely taking Zionism to its logical messianic limits. It is no accident that the founders of Gush Emunim, the Greater Israel movement came from the left of the Labour Zionist movement – Tabenkin, Galili and Allon – all prominent in Palmach.

      Sorry +972 but if you want I will do you an article explaining all this!

      Reply to Comment
      • Lewis from Afula

        I agree with Tony. The ongoing fraudulent use of the oppressed “fakestinyans” represents the root of the conflict.
        It is important to remember before June 1967, these people held JORDANIAN IDS & passports.
        Then in June 1967, these JORDANIANS attacked Israel with genocidal intenstions.
        After losing their war, the aggressors transmuted into the fake “fakestinyan” entity.
        Irrespective of their current nomenclature, the aggressor community must PAY for its past crimes and ongoing terroristic activities.
        Appeasement of Aggressors always leads to more aggression !

        Reply to Comment
      • Some-one.

        Thank you so much for that very interesting post. Something I think be very interesting to see is a comparative study of the Mizrahim in Palestine and the working class and small farming Protestant communities in the North of Ireland.

        Reply to Comment
      • Ray

        Yossi Gurvitz has written a bit about his views on this matter:

        https://mondoweiss.net/2017/07/sorry-american-birthright/
        https://972mag.com/the-nytimes-has-it-wrong-israels-roots-are-not-liberal/51819/

        To whit, Zionism without Judaic/Messianic nationalism suffers an identity crisis: how do you justify taking the land if God didn’t give it to you, if you’re NOT the chosen people? Otherwise, you’re just another conquistador (maybe desperate, scared and traumatized, but a conquistador nonetheless). Without religion, then, all there is (beyond naked ethno-nationalist self-interest) is some vague metaphysical collective unconscious “yearning” to “return home.”

        Reply to Comment
    2. Joel

      For some reason American progressives like to view Israeli politics through Mizrachi-Ashkenazi glasses. Maybe it rings well with their view of American identity politics. The Mizrachi-Ashkenazi tension that was a major problem in Israel a few decades ago is mostly gone. Mizrachim are scattered throughout all of the political parties, and a large percentage of younger Israelis are of mixed background.

      There isn’t even much of a right-left divide in Israel. The two main parties are not much different on questions of security and international policy. Nor is there much interest among the citizens for more leftist or socialist economic policies.

      The article appears to be written about an imagined Israel, not the real one.

      Reply to Comment
      • john

        where does the israeli author map american race relations onto israel? did you even read the article?

        Reply to Comment
        • Joel

          I certainly read it. It postulates a Mizrachi-Ashkenazi divide that for the vast majority of Israelis no longer exists. This is why Shas has shrunken, why there are Mizrachim in nearly every party, and why the top generals in the army are often Mizrachim.

          The “collective Israeli identity” is actually stronger than before.

          The article is disconnected from Israeli reality. I can’t prove that the author is projecting American identity politics onto Israel, but this warped view of Israel comes from somewhere, and that somewhere isn’t in Israel.

          Reply to Comment
          • john

            then, way to begin your comment with something you can’t prove, followed up with something stated in the article as if it proved something different: “Mizrahi politicians did not form alliances with one another, opting instead to join parties that had been established by Ashkenazim. Mizrahi identity, it turned out, was the only one among many that was seen as illegitimate. This was a time when Russian, ultra-Orthodox, Arab, and religious parties abounded. The Mizrahim, however, were severely criticized whenever their representatives stepped out of line…”

            Reply to Comment
          • john

            if you’d read it, you’d know the author makes the same point you do – not that ashkenazi and mizrahi are divided, but that mizrahi are divided. (“Mizrahi politicians did not form alliances with one another, opting instead to join parties that had been established by Ashkenazim. Mizrahi identity, it turned out, was the only one among many that was seen as illegitimate. This was a time when Russian, ultra-Orthodox, Arab, and religious parties abounded. The Mizrahim, however, were severely criticized whenever their representatives stepped out of line…”)
            of course there’s less divide among jewish israelis, because they’re more united than ever in the dispossession of palestinians.

            Reply to Comment
          • john

            where does it postulate this divide? why bring up something that you have no evidence for?

            Reply to Comment
    3. Firentis

      Secular Zionism is not based on a god given land of Israel. It is based on (1) The need for a Jewish homeland and (2) The land being the historical homeland of the Jewish people. (2) also allows it to find common cause with more religiously minded people, but that is a tangential aspect of secular Zionism. Secular Zionism has of course made regular use of the religious narrative for PR purposes but that is about it.

      The Right has two components. Revisionist Zionism, which is just another form of secular Zionism and religious Zionism, which isn’t. The two have been fellow travelers as they stood in opposition to the Leftist Socialist Zionism which was the establishment ideology in the first years of the state.

      Where Tony Greenstein is right is that trying to analyze Israeli politics on the basis of the Ashkenazi/Mizrahi split is really dumb. That split isn’t particularly meaningful. The more meaningful divisions in Israel are the Arab/Jew and the ultra-orthodox/non ultra-orthodox divisions. Much of the Jewish population (Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Russian, secular, masorti, and most of the religious Zionists) for the most part share a collective Zionist Israeli Jewish identity. Dividing them into tribes isn’t a particularly useful frame of analysis because they behave in very similar ways. The most obvious examples of that is in marriage and politics/voting. All those groups intermarry and have no problem running on the same lists and voting for the same lists. Outside of the ultra-orthodox Shas all attempts to form a sectoral Mizrahi party have failed. Identity politics focusing on the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi divide have failed miserably in elections.

      Mizrahi identity isn’t seen as a threat. It isn’t a real identity. If it was it would actually motivate people to act politically in some sort of concerted manner. It hasn’t. The discourse about it is alive only because some academics in the Left think it is somehow useful to promote it as an extension of their unrelated anti-establishment political views.

      “Liberman hopes to elevate Russian-speakers to the same status as that of the veteran Ashkenazi elites.”

      It is a generational thing. There is no meaningful difference between veteran Israelis and the generation of “Russians” that grew up in Israel. You can barely tell them apart in terms of their habits or political views. The elderly Russians are the only ones Liberman actually appeals to. The same is true about Shas’ appeal to non ultra-orthodox Mizrahi Jews. Liberman doesn’t ‘hope’ to elevate Russian-speakers. They don’t need it. It is only a matter of time. This is why Liberman is trying everything he can to expand his base beyond the elderly Russians. Because there isn’t enough sectoral ‘Russian’ support for him to do much more than barely scrape by the electoral threshold and the numbers are dropping. The extra seats he won in this election didn’t come from ‘Russians’.

      Reply to Comment
      • Ben

        “Secular Zionism is not based on a god given land of Israel. It is based on (1) The need for a Jewish homeland and (2) The land being the historical homeland of the Jewish people.”

        Good, then there is no need to worship the land and the stones and the spirits and to covet every last centimeter fanatically and therefore no need to not divide the land along the ’67 lines with the indigenous people displaced by this project, and no need to not make “The Land” the historic homeland of both peoples, and make peace. Anything else degenerates into a Disneyland-style homeland vanity project not worth the awful price.

        And yes the Arab/Jew and the ultra-orthodox/non ultra-orthodox divisions are meaningful and need your attention and actually share much between them. As Yousef Munayyer put it: “Avigdor Lieberman is in the interesting position of having to decide who he hates more: Arabs or Religious Jews. A virulent secular nativist (who was born in Moldova and doesn’t even live in sovereign Israeli territory) he built his career on hating both.”

        Reply to Comment
        • Firentis

          Sure. Once the Palestinian accept that this is the homeland of two peoples and accept the principle of two states for two peoples there is minimal ideological stumbling blocks to partition here for the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews. What isn’t negotiable here is the Jewish state, not its borders, although the state has to be defensible which the 1967 borders are not.

          Liberman is an opportunist. Lapid left him an opening when he joined Blue&White. Liberman jumped straight into it.

          Reply to Comment
          • Ben

            “Jewish state”–a gimmick literally invented by Bibi late in the game…a cynical political/tactical gimmick, moreover, that Bibi and his allies on the right have done everything they can to overtly attach to it the most extreme, offensive, discriminatory meanings and intent, not innocent and peacemaking but malicious, and purposefully deal-breaking both in its devising and the reason for its devising, and it in its long term intent. It’s very “what could be wrong with that?” calculated, feigned innocence is part of all that.

            Reply to Comment
    4. Nathanael

      Exceptionally accurate. Thank you. The Ashkenazi colonialist project has to end for Israel to join the modern world. But like the colonialists of South Africa who established apartheid, they won’t do it yet.

      Reply to Comment
      • joel

        what do you mean by “Ashkenazi colonialist project”?

        Reply to Comment
      • Lewis from Afula

        What about the Arab 7th Century Colonialist project ?

        Reply to Comment