There are MANY problems with MAD, one that is hopeful in ways, namely that when push comes to shove and to keep one’s word after a limited strike, many don’t do the all-out assault in response.

In fact, its never happened yet. The only nuclear use historically has been planned. Japan in 1945. It was warned that “we” have a doomsday device, and will use it if you don’t give up, and that was the only time a nuclear device has been used.

Thankfully.

Like I said, I’m not confident. I don’t know anyone that is.

I’m not sure that you made your argument convincingly Larry. I think that if you want to get to the status of persuasive, you might have to dig further, into the military logic, from the horses’ mouths (both sides).

If you get to unknown, or risk, then you are in neo-con world. I remember Rumsfeld on multiple occassions talking about the logic that he employs when dealing with unknowns. They quantify the degree of risk and run literally simulated computer games to generate a statistical profile of scenarios, and then their value judgements kick in.

Paralysis is NOT a compelling argument to a military mind. They need A strategy, that is most confident if not actually.

And, they do think multiple moves out.

The source of my doubt is Hezbollah. They currently comprise the Iranian deterrent. But, even if the shelling that preceeded the Lebanese abductions in 2006, were just limited to that single incident, it indicates a willingness to do something stupid for some advantage.

Maybe the 2006 rampage on Lebanon served as a “deterrent” to Hezbollah.

I hope that other means are used to keep stability.

There are still MANY, that hope for Israel on the run, of which 2006 is an example.

I’m convinced that one of the reasons that Israel in 2006 was so excessive was to counter the assertion that a three-front war on Israel was possible.

Shalit had just been abducted. In the same week, there was a very similar thwarted attempted abduction in the West Bank, then the Hezbollah abduction.

Making one’s enemy scared by multiple incidents (whether abductions, or suicide bombings), may seem to be effective to a desparate collective militancy, accomplishes little in fact.

A balance of forces is tenuous. We are LUCKY that there was no precipitating event that made the balance of forces less of balanced deterrent and more of stimuli to violence.

For example, the Cuban missile crisis could have gone south.

There is good reason for nuclear non-profileration protocols, rather than relying binary deterrence, especially in situations of triangular nuclear power animosity, or more.

You’ve read 1984, including of the triangular aggression of shifting alliances, sometimes confused and unstable?

Well, I can only assume that I have won since you haven’t responded to my points, especially those pointing out the flaws in your logic. Cheers.

To answer your questions about the SU and China. When these countries had developed nuclear weapons their neighborhoods had been relatively cleanly partitioned and the red lines of influence between them were relatively clear. Even so, the world nearly got destroyed several times during the course of the nuclear standoff, most memorably during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that incident there was a lack of clear rules to govern the behavior of the nuclear armed rivals and the result was nearly catastrophic. As such, the argument that there will be no nuclear war or miscalculation because there hasn’t been one is a white swan argument at best. Given the history of nuclear standoffs it is an extremely problematic one given that your subject matter is the Middle East – a region with weak states and weak institutions where the borders are artificial and porous and with a preponderance of non-state actors acting on the most irrational of motivations yet influencing the actions of [ often themselves questionably rational ] states.
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“I don’t think the U.S./Israel/Mideast WILL react calmly to Iranian nukes, but I think that if they did, a nuclear Iran wouldn’t be such a problem.”
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There is a glaring problem with your logic. Let’s put aside partitioning the blame for the BAD outcome and take it as a given that you acknowledge that the consequences of Iran achieving nuclear weapons will very likely be BAD. Yet you claim that the correct course of action is still to allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Do you realize that there is a logical flaw in your logic? Now you do continue to place the blame for the outcome on the region’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear weapons rather than on Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. That is, a reaction that wouldn’t take place at all if Iran had no nuclear weapons in the first place. Do you realize the flaw here? Ok, moving on, let’s take into account your admission that the region’s reaction will be bad. That is, a priori, you presume that the reaction will be bad, but in order to make your argument that Iran’s having nuclear weapons isn’t terrible you would have to come up with a set of reasons why your initial presumption of a bad reaction will be mitigated in the future. Do you have such a list or a conceivable scenario in mind over the long-term in which the outcome of a nuclear armed Iran is not terrible? Please be as realistic as possible and I hope that you aren’t going to continue relying on the precedent argument of things barely working out in other situations to argue that though YOUR presumption is that of a bad situation things will work out fine, because that position relies on faith rather than logic.
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“What are the dangers of starting a war with Iran?”
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I would rephrase this into, “What are the dangers of attacking Iran’s nuclear installations?”. That depends on whether it is the US or Israel that attacks the installations. If it is Israel then it is likely to lead to a war with Hezbollah and Hamas while Iran resorts to terrorism abroad. If it is the US then the reaction is likely to be very similar, perhaps with some additional Iranian actions in the Persian Gulf. The result of a strike will be the postponement of Iranian nuclear weapons by several years. This can be repeated [ by the US certainly and possibly by Israel ] until Iran chooses to change its policy and given a commitment to do just that the rational choice in Iran would be to change its policy. In nearly all scenarios, assuming that Iran can be prevented from developing nuclear weapons, the outcome is better than that of a confrontation in the long-term where Iran has nuclear weapons or a scenario where the region is awash with nuclear weapons. Whatever damage Iran can do in a conventional war is a pittance to the damage caused by even a Hiroshima or Nagasaki yield nuclear weapon on Tel Aviv. Even with MAD such a scenario simply can not be ruled out once nuclear weapons are in play and MAD is just not a reliable mechanism in the Middle East.
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“What if any effect do you think those threats are having on U.S. and Europe’s Iran policy?”
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They demonstrate that time is limited and force a more realistic view of the unfolding scenario where the preferred mode of most countries is to postpone risk and hope for the best. In itself the threats do not motivate anyone to do anything, but by making it plain that the likely outcome of continued Iranian nuclear weapons production is going to be heavily destabilizing it changes the calculus of some of the other players. For the Americans the Israeli threats are a timing consideration, not an overall policy driver. The policy of the United States is to prevent the emergence of a dominant hostile player in the Persian Gulf and this has nothing whatsoever to do with Israel. Iran by building nuclear weapons threatens to undermine that policy entirely. For the Americans, the Israeli threats are useful levers to push for action from other states in pursuit of a classically American policy towards the Persian Gulf.