Nakba Day protest May 15, 2012 (Activestills)

In 2008, a fascinating, little-known study asked 500 Israeli Jews about Israel’s behavior throughout the history of the conflict.  The study was conducted by Rafi Nets-Zehngut, at the Teachers College of Columbia University and Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University’s School of Education. Bar-Tal is an internationally regarded expert in political psychology. Some of the findings were striking:

• More than six-in-ten said that prior to the arrival of the “Jewish pioneers” in the late 19th century, Palestinians were a majority in the region (“majority,” “vast majority,” or “exclusive inhabitants”).

• A majority, albeit very slim (50.2 percent), said that Jews and Arabs share the blame equally (46 percent) or primarily Jews (4.2 percent) are to blame for the outbreak and continuation of the Israeli-Arab conflict, while 43 percent blamed primarily Palestinians and Arabs.

• Most important for Nakba Day, when asked who was responsible for the “departure” of Palestinian refugees during the 1948 War of Independence, 41 percent chose the traditional Zionist narrative that they left due to fear and exhortations of Arab leaders; but 39 percent chose a response that cited fear and calls of Arab leaders, but also due to expulsion by Jews. Another eight percent cited only expulsion by Jews. That means that nearly half – a 47 percent plurality – accepted the Jewish role in creating Palestinian refugees.

Further, by using the terms “Palestinian” to refer to the pre-state days through 1948, the questions themselves implicitly tested people’s acceptance of the terms of the debate. The fairly standard rate of “don’t knows” indicates that people had little problem with the assumptions in the text of the questions. Also, fewer than one-fifth of Jewish Israelis describe themselves as left wing these days, so a significant portion of those respondents are either center or right wing.

The findings imply a potentially significant shift in Israeli attitudes compared to the past, when the Palestinian refugees were the greatest obstacle of all. During the Camp David negotiations of 2000, when I was working with American pollster Stanley Greenberg supplying public opinion data to then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak almost nightly, the refugee issue tended to be the toughest problem, even as the Jewish public advanced significantly toward unprecedented compromises on Jerusalem (documented in Greenberg’s 2009 book). Just after the talks collapsed, a Hebrew University survey in late July, 2000 asked Israelis (and Palestinians) whether they thought their respective leader’s compromises on each item had been appropriate, too much or too little. Among Israelis, the perception of Barak’s proposed compromises on Palestinian refugees gathered the highest “too much of a compromise” response of all (64 percent gave this answer, compared to 57 percent for Jerusalem).

Twelve years later, in a December, 2012 survey by the same authors (Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki), the Palestinian refugee question no longer holds the most-rejected-clause spot. That distinction now goes to the proposals on Jerusalem, based on the old Clinton framework (59 percent rejected them, 38 percent supported them). Respondents were asked about a refugee compromise which reflects the Clinton, Geneva Plan and Arab Peace Initiative approach:

Both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property.

Among the 600-person sample, which included Arabs, 42 percent accepted this and 49 percent rejected it – a significant decline from nearly two-thirds who felt it was “too much of a compromise” in 2000.

Behind the numbers lies a potential drama. First, they confirm what Noam Sheizaf elegantly argued, that the anti-Nakba onslaught under the previous government has failed to erase the Nakba from the public sphere, while general usage and awareness of the term has only increased. Bar-Tal also noted in a more recent study that the Israeli education system is increasingly open about exploring critical versions of history – findings that were met with a wall of resistance by the Israeli government, for the crime of comparing Israel and the Palestinians’ education system.

But the data shown here hints at something both deeper and more pragmatic. They suggest a growing realization among the Israeli people that the Nakba is not only a feature of history but alive in the present-lived reality of Palestinians and that it must be addressed in the negotiations.

Indeed, for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the Nakba lives on in the form of daily occupation. Symbolically, Israel’s denial and until recently the world’s general dismissal of their historical and present symbolic narrative is a fresh death each day for the Palestinian collective psyche.

Despite the positive shifts, half of Israelis still reject the refugee compromise in the December 2012 poll; tempers rage around public debate on the topic, and a 2009 survey for the peace movement One Voice found that 60 percent of Israeli Jews totally rejected a compromise that included “recognition of the suffering” of Palestinian refugees.

Yet I cannot agree with a guest post here today that the rejection is due to “arrogance.”

In a phone interview with Daniel Bar-Tal for this article, he explained that the ongoing Jewish resistance to dealing with the Nakba is simply a reflection of the fact that the Jewish people as a nation are no more or less immune to the human characteristics of collective identity than any other people:

On the most universal level: why is it hard for any nation [to acknowledge the damage it has caused in the past]? It’s very, very universal [to resist this]. All nations do it.

He cited the very recent British acknowledgment of responsibility for its actions in Kenya, and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s difficulty acknowledging France’s behavior in Algiers. “Nations have a hard time opening their Pandora’s box,” he said. “We’re no different.”

Bar-Tal believes that the story of the Nakba, a symbolic narrative of the Palestinian nation, clashes with the Zionist national narrative.

This reason is more psychological, but critical: identity. The Nakba … is viewed as the identity of the whole nation in the eyes of its people. And accepting the narrative of the other cancels my identity. If you have to accept that 1.3 million Palestinians were here, all the Zionist rationale begins to be thrown into doubt.

Bar-Tal then explained that when Netanyahu introduced the demand that Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish State, the negotiations were now about symbolic and identity dimensions, rather than, by implication, just technical and pragmatic solutions.

He brought that into the conflict – up to then we could have solved the problem without narratives. The moment you ask them to recognize that this land is and belongs to Jews, they can’t accept that.

Perhaps it was at this point that the Nakba was increasingly embraced among Palestinian activists. And by contrast to Bar-Tal’s implication, I believe that the symbolic, narrative element of conflict would inevitably enter resolution efforts regardless of Netanyahu’s particular condition.

In other words, when Israelis or any people are asked to acknowledge historical facts and their own role in creating traumas, they are less defensive. But when dry history doubles as the mythical story of the founding of a rival nation, acknowledging those facts means legitimizing the other side’s fundamental beliefs. Since the Israeli image of the Palestinian national vision includes the certainty that Palestinians seek destruction of the Jews, the national narratives – like in most conflicts – are mutually exclusive. Accepting this keystone of Palestinian symbolic national history is tantamount to self-destruction.

Surely, similar conflict psychology can be seen on the Palestinian side too. Even when a conflict is asymmetrical, psychological dynamics overlap. But that would be a separate article.

Both sides will need to exorcise their demons regarding the other, not to gloss over the present but in order to unlock the door to the future. Here are the fundamental questions for the Israel side: first, can the Right’s frenzied efforts to stifle consciousness of the Nakba succeed? The results seem to say no. Activism recalling the Nakba has only heightened and the data here implies that the Israeli public is ahead of its leaders in acknowledging not only history, but the implications of history on conflict resolution.

Secondly, how can the large swath of the Israeli public that is prepared to reconcile with its past in the present be expanded and leveraged? How can this political maturity be brought to bear on future negotiation efforts or any other effort to resolve the situation? Surely, beating a guilt-fatigued population with more historic guilt will backfire (if it hasn’t already). Is there a less threatening way to address and redress history that does not undercut Jewish identity in this land? This is one of the vital challenges of the day, that the Nakba (and perhaps the “Jewish state” definition, for Palestinians) symbolizes for all parties in the conflict: can each side acknowledge the most sensitive and frightening aspects of the other party’s identity without losing its own, and then lashing out violently to protect it?

Read more:
PHOTOS: Palestinians commemorate Nakba Day with rallies and protests
The Nakba: Addressing Israeli arrogance
Despite efforts to erase it, the Nakba’s memory is more present than ever in Israel
Report: Forced displacement on both sides of the Green Line
Remembering the Nakba, understanding this is a shared land

Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Obama and Israeli ambassador to Washington Michael Oren at Ben Gurion airport, March 20 2013 (photo: Government Press Office)

As President Obama continues his meetings in the region today, making the rounds to Ramallah and then back to Jerusalem, it is useful to keep in mind some trends regarding public opinion. Here are two specific themes that are relevant for this trip – attitudes towards the two-state solution to which he and his main interlocutors are so committed, and attitudes towards him.

Regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Joint Israeli Palestinian Polls by the Truman Institute at Hebrew University show that Israeli and Palestinian public has very little hope for any sort of peace agreement: over 60 percent on both sides do not believe there is a chance of reaching such an agreement at this stage. The full data is available here from the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University.

The survey also tested the “whole package,” by asking respondents separately about specific clauses of an agreement, based mainly on the Clinton/Geneva parameters regarding final borders and territorial exchange, a demilitarized Palestinian state, refugees, security, Jerusalem, and the “end of conflict” clause. Here are the results:

•  Among Israelis, a 56 percent majority supports the plan and 40 percent are opposed – this is almost the same data as the previous year.

•  Among Palestinians, a majority of 53 percent opposes the plan and 46 percent supports it – a significant change from last year, when the population was split, but 50 percent supported it. Apparently somewhere between Operation Pillar of Defense and the UN bid, which hasn’t changed much so far, Palestinians lost some motivation for the two-state plan along the way.

However, another study shows the Israeli public is losing patience with some aspects of the permanent conflict for internal reasons. In an internet survey commissioned by a grassroots movement called “Electing a social budget” just prior to the January elections, respondents were asked about the extent of spending cuts they would recommend for a number of areas, in order to cut the country’s deficit. The survey was from 2-6 January, had 591 respondents, and 4.1 percent margin of error.

•  By a very wide margin, the highest support for the largest cuts (cuts were ranked on a scale of 0-5, with 5 as the greatest spending cut) was for the settlement budget: fully 63.4 percent of the sample selected very large cuts to the settlement budget.

•  That number is 50 points higher than the second-ranked answer for the highest spending cuts. But interestingly, second place went to the security budget (14.8 percent chose to cut spending), which is actually tied (within the margin of error) for the third-ranked “large cuts” item: infrastructure such as train tracks (14.6 percent).

When considering the average from the 0-5 ranking of the extent of cuts to the budgets – the settlement budget obviously had the highest score, with 4.2 (remember, “5″ denoted the largest cuts). But this was also true among those who identified themselves as right wing: the average score was 3.8, but this was higher than the average for any other item among the Right.

‘Why Did Obama Throw Israel Under the Bus?’ The Israeli answer – he didn’t.

The myth that Israelis dislike Obama tends to be based on media surveys that are either shoddily conducted or interpreted, like the following Maariv poll by Ma’agar Mohot (Hebrew ) from the day before the president’s visit. The article never mentions sample size or margin of error – those minor details. It refers to a poll of the “Israeli public,” without specifying whether this is a “representative sample” (i.e., includes Arabs) or Jews only, which is also common.

•  The article reports that 38 percent think Obama is hostile to Israel, while one-third (presumably around 33 percent, but the article does not specify) think he is friendly and 14 percent say he is indifferent. If it’s not clear: A minority thinks he’s hostile.

•  The article specifies that only 10 percent love Obama, while three times as many (32 percent) don’t love him but respect him. Well. Do Israelis really have to love him?

However, it is true that Israelis have held suspicious, mixed and changing views during Obama’s first term, and questions about whether he was more loyal to Palestinians or Israelis sometimes favored the former. Nathan Jeffay gave a good review of the data and speculations about their meaning – back in 2009. But by April 2012, Israelis were evenly divided about which side he was one (one-quarter each thought he was more pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian), and the plurality thought he was neutral (36 percent).

But the latest Peace Index survey from Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute (n=600, 11-14 March, representative sample) asks questions with more substance and depth, and the picture is quite different. When the survey asked if people thought President Obama’s attitude toward Israel was friendly or not:

•  42.5 percent believe he is friendly (very-somewhat).

•  Only 37 percent of the Jewish respondents say he is friendly to Israel, but that’s more than three times as many as those who think he is hostile (10.5 percent).

•  The large plurality, 44.5 percent of the total public, thinks he is “professional/neutral.”

The survey then asked the controversial question about whether Obama sides more with Israelis or with Palestinians.

•  One-quarter (25 percent) actually believe he is more pro-Israel, compared to 18 percent who think he is pro-Palestinian.

•  It is true that among Jewish Israelis, just 18 percent think he is pro-Israeli and 23 percent view him as pro-Palestinian.

•  Yet in both cases (Jews and total population), the majority believe that Obama is neutral (over 50 percent), which is not exactly a bad thing for someone who is supposed to be an honest broker.

•  If only Palestinians felt that way; they don’t. Although the sample is too small to be certain, the trend is also very strong: Seventy percent of Arabs in Israel in this same survey think that he is more pro-Israeli, 6.6 percent view him as pro-Palestinian and under one-fifth view him as neutral.

Here’s the final question from the Peace Index that is indicative: “To what extent do you currently trust or not trust U.S. President Barack Obama to consider Israel’s interests and safeguard them?” The response from the general public is solid, and a far cry from the throwing-under-the-bus myth:

•  A 52 percent majority say he can be trusted (greatly or somewhat); 46 percent do not trust him (somewhat or “not at all” – but the latter is just 12 percent).

•  Among Jews, 45 percent trust  him to consider and safeguard such interests, compared to 53.5 percent who do not. Again, among Jews who do not trust him, 40 percent give a moderate answer (“not so much”) and just a minority – 13.5 percent – say “not at all.”

Still, one is led to wonder what maintains the suspicion lingering among many Israeli Jews. His government isolated itself to vote against a Palestinian state in the U.N. He helped Israel deal with the crisis at the embassy in Cairo; insisted on maintaining massive foreign aid to Israel at the toughest of times. It is painful to think that the vague suspicion is linked vaguely to his middle name; but surely the strong show of friendship on the first day of Obama’s visit is likely to yield some changes in the next numbers we’ll see.

Correction appended: 40 percent of Israelis are opposed to the “whole package” plan, not 50%.

*On Gaza, the majority know that Israel is no better off after the war in Gaza, and that the ceasefire won’t hold.

*On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the majority supports negotiations, supports the basic outlines of the Arab peace initiative and knows that the Palestinians cannot simply be beaten.

*The majority acknowledges discrimination against Arabs in Israel, and a strong majority believes democracy is either more important than Jewishness of the state, or that they are equally important.

The data here comes from the most recent survey by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull of the University of Maryland (always an excellent resource) and the Peace Index by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and Israel Democracy Institute. Both samples were surveyed following the war with Gaza (Telhami and Kull’s research began just hours before the ceasefire began), with 600 respondents in the U. of Maryland poll, and 598 in the Peace Index. Both therefore have just a small sample of Arab respondents.

Gaza. Israelis do believe that the war was justified in light of the results – the Jews (84 percent), with Arabs evenly divided. Forty percent of Jews and one-quarter of Arabs believe Israel’s deterrence power is better than before the war, according to the Peace Index; the remainder think it is the same or weaker (or have no opinion).

But people hold no illusions about having solved any problems: just 19 percent believe that the ceasefire will last more than a year; the majority, 54 percent, believe it will last between a few months up to one year, in the Peace Index. The remainder say it’s only a matter of days or weeks until further fighting.

And just 37 percent believe that the government actually fulfilled its goals (without specifying what those goals were) – with no real difference between Jews and Arabs. Over half of both groups believe that only some or none of the goals were achieved. Only one-quarter (27 percent) in the U. of Maryland survey believes that a military approach can solve the Gaza problem at all.

So why do Israelis justify the war? Mostly because they believe Israel had to respond in self-defense to the rocket fire and this was the only option. After all, no leader has suggested or even entertained a non-military response. Note to self: In my next survey, I’ll ask “what is the best response,” and offer military and non-military options; I want to believe people believe there’s another way.

Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Although both surveys show that people are pessimistic about the idea that peace can actually work, the majority of Israelis (including nearly 60 percent of Jews) support negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Critics will say that Israelis favor negotiations just in order to drag them out – but the finding still represents a divergence from the record of the Israeli leadership, which has not managed to hold them. (For the record, I think that during the brief and partial settlement freeze, Abu Mazen should have agreed to negotiate, although Netanyahu’s “conditions” made it nigh impossible.)

A majority of the public accepts the Arab Peace Initiative as is, or as a basis for negotiations  – even though in the U. of Maryland survey they were told only that this involves a solution along the 1967 lines, with adjustments. Among Jews, 50 percent accepted this, compared to 46 percent who did not.

Nearly three-quarters of the whole public realize that if the two-state solution collapses, the situation will be bad. Note: this is my interpretation. It includes 37 percent who said the status quo would continue; but given that this survey actually began during and following a war that saw rockets fired on Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and a bus bombing sent PTSD shockwaves from the second Intifada rippling through the population – it’s hard to believe that respondents love the status quo (although prior to this war, many did view it as tolerable). Another 35 percent said there would be intense conflict for years if the two-state solution falls (72 percent total). Thirteen percent envisioned a one-state solution; only six percent believe Palestinians will just give up one day. (All from the U. of Maryland study.)

Democracy, discrimination and Arab citizens. The U. of Maryland survey offers no great news; but with 55 percent who believe there is discrimination against Arabs, at least the majority is not hiding from reality.

One-third (Jews only) say democracy is more important to them than the Jewishness of the state, up from 26 percent last year. At that time, 47 percent said both were equally important; at present 35 percent say so. That’s not a bad thing in itself: it’s natural that people wish for a state that reflects their national character. The question is rather how the national character is defined and implemented; and it is non-negotiable that a democratic state must ensure total and equal rights, de jure and de facto, for citizens who do not share the majority identity. Thirty-one percent say Jewishness of the state is more important to them than democracy; that’s likely to create a genuine obstacle to equality of all citizens.

*****

Here are a few takeaways:

*The Netanyahu government is not fooling citizens with its military bluster. Most do not believe anyone can win this way.

*The Telhami/Kull (Maryland) poll, like various others throughout the year, also shows only a minority in support of a unilateral strike on Iran.

*The public cannot be an excuse for the government’s failure to advance negotiations with the Palestinians. There is every reason to believe that a reasonable two-state agreement could still be passed (although as I’ve written, the situation on the ground makes that increasingly unlikely).

Thus the number of areas where Israelis differ from the Netanyahu leadership is significant.

Further the much-discussed demographic rightward shift is not necessarily what it seems. When the positions on specific issues are checked, the population may be evenly balanced, or a majority can be found that is moderate, ready for compromise, prepared for restraint, or does not believe in military solutions.

The final puzzle, then, is why Israelis insist on supporting a government with which they disagree on such key policies, that has failed them on both security and socio-economic fronts for three years?

I believe it has to do with the fact that with relation to conflict, the government says things the population can agree with: we want peace, we are prepared for a two-state solution, but this isn’t the time. Perhaps if the government were to tell the truth about its policies: “we don’t intend ever to reach a two-state solution because we can never accept the idea of a Palestinian state, we are doing everything to create a territorial and diplomatic reality that demolishes any cohesive notion of a Palestinian entity and we intend to govern all the land ourselves including an additional 2.5 million West Bank Palestinians” the electoral map might be different. That is, if the people are as rational as their answers imply.

Click here for more election polls from +972′s Poll Tracker.

Just one-quarter of the Jewish public (27 percent) in Israel supports a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran, according to a new Peace Index survey from August 7-8, focused mainly on Iran. Fully 61 percent of the 516 Jewish respondents are against such a strike, with over one-quarter strongly opposed – even a majority on the right is opposed (51 percent).

If Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak truly hope to rally the public for war, they are not succeeding. Barely one-third (33 percent) expect them to actually carry out attack, while 56 percent do not. Fifty-seven percent are convinced that the duo is bluffing and posturing.

Worse still for Netanyahu and Barak, a strong majority of the Jewish public doesn’t even trust them to make the decision: the survey, run by the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University, shows that barely over one-quarter (28 percent) are convinced by Barak’s message that Israel must act “before Iran attains nuclear capability.” When given a choice, 57 percent chose instead to believe the senior security echelons, who oppose an attack; even the self-identified right is split dead even on which figures to trust.

Perhaps Netanyahu’s single greatest failure on this issue is that the Israeli public rejects his cherished baby, the existential threat. Poor Netanyahu: For three years, he has been hammering away at the theme that Iran equals the holocaust of the Jewish people. He has recited this at every opportunity, almost to the exclusion of anything else. He is nothing if not “on message.”

But the Israeli public merely displays resilience:

When presented with the proposition that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be stopped, and Israel must formulate its defense strategy on the assumption that it is no longer the only nuclear power in the region – in other words, reconciling itself to a nuclear Iran – an absolute majority of 60 percent agreed; only 35 percent disagreed.

To be sure, Israeli Jews would be far happier if Iran’s program would be stopped, and do not trust Western diplomatic efforts; 70 percent feel that Israel cannot rely on US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s promise that Iran will not have nuclear weapons. Three-quarters believe that a strike coordinated with the U.S. has a high chance of seriously delaying the Iranian nuclear program.

Given how skeptical the Jewish public is about the effectiveness of international diplomatic efforts, the lack of support for Netanyahu and Barak’s approach is, well, striking.

Actually it’s amazing is that despite the near-obsession of Netanyahu, Barak and the press, there seems to have been no movement of public opinion at all in recent months about Iran. Surveys I gathered this spring showed practically identical numbers. This is from April:

…The public…diverge[s] sharply from the leadership’s policy: Survey after survey, as I wrote in March, showed that only a minority – somewhere between 19 percent and 31 percent – favors a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran. The majority – at least half (here’s a similar survey in Hebrew), and up to nearly two-thirds (Hebrew) – is against a unilateral attack.

Here are my educated guesses about why such majorities of the Jewish interviewees aren’t excited about an attack.

• It won’t work: A majority of 55 percent said there were very low or moderately low chances that a strike will significantly delay the nuclear program; just 36 percent gave somewhat high or high chances.

• It’s not Osirak: It would be natural to compare the Iran debate to Israel’s strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981. The general mantra in Israel is that our crack defense establishment does what’s right even (and sometimes especially) when it’s not politically correct, the world condemns us, and everyone’s secretly happy in the end. But we don’t hear much about Osirak lately. That’s because there’s a big difference: Iraq did not go to war with Israel following the strike and there were not 500 or even 300 Israeli casualties, in return for moderate-to-low chances of a mere delay in nuclear armament. 

• It’s the economy, tembel (stupid): In focus groups about various political issues I ran a few weeks ago, Iran hardly came up. People did talk at great length about daily economic hardships, like the cost of day care for the kids: “It’s crazy, it’s like another salary. For me, that’s everything at this point. Sure, there’s the security thing and the Iranian threat, but I get up and go to work and that’s what bothers me,” said one participant.  The way our brave leaders quake at the thought of trimming the defense budget, preferring instead to gouge the middle class, is wearing thin.

That leaves the eternal paradox: if people don’t support the policy, why don’t they actively oppose it? Despite noble attempts to hold Facebook-driven anti-war demonstrations all week, just a handful attended.

Here’s my opinion about why: First, the security mystique reigns supreme. Although people don’t like the idea of a strike, I hear many saying “there are things we don’t know” – as they nod their heads and accept the mysterium tremendum. (Personally, I think that if the government expects me to rally round a war it starts, I deserve to know why that war is right for the country. A possibility of a 1-2 year delay is not sufficient. I want a list of concrete benefits – a long list.)

Second, the Peace Index shows that Israelis don’t place much faith in the other (international, diplomatic) options.

Third, the social protests proved to many that the government does not listen to people. So why bother? That’s what some friends wrote on Facebook this week. And that’s exactly what this government likes to hear.

Flush from the success of its third annual conference, J Street stands at tough crossroads. Its first two years of heady success as the receptacle for an emotional outpouring of long-suppressed liberal Jewish sentiment have run headlong into the unforgiving landscape of American-Jewish-Israel-politics.

The powerful Jewish establishment initially tried to swat down J Street like an annoyance, but as the buzz grew the establishment unleashed its anger, desperate to delegitimize J Street from the right. Over the last year or so, the fledgling lobby took a barrage of criticism over its position that the US should not oppose a UN resolution condemning settlements, only to be flogged by the left for opposing the Palestinian unilateral statehood bid last September. Critique of the harder, outspoken left now flows freely, on a lineup of issues.

The Obama Administration, which J Street originally hoped would usher in a policy paradigm shift, has stagnated dangerously on the peace process, perhaps capitulating to the vise-like grip of the established right-wing American Jewish lobby. Has J Street disappointed the left and been defeated by the Jewish-American right? Is it toeing a line too fine to make a difference? Or is it staking out a genuine ground and digging in to reach a deeper level of long-term  change?

Two days after the conference ended, I spoke with founder Jeremy Ben Ami about some of these issues. The conversation here has been edited for length and clarity.

———

If Jeremy’s energy level is any indicator, the answer is clear: J Street is single-minded and undaunted. Before I even managed to ask a question, he was gushing about the conference:

Attendance was up 25 percent compared to last year (to 2,500). The enthusiasm level seemed not all diminished despite realities on the ground. On the Hill and in politics, there are people we couldn’t get a meeting with two years ago, and one year ago we could get a staff person. Now they’re meeting and agreeing to put their name on letter, when two years ago we wouldn’t have even been allowed in the door. Person by person, office by office.

DS: As Obama’s first term draws to a close, how do you view the arc of his approach to the conflict? What do you see as his most and least successful moves?

One, he came into office with the clear recognition that resolving the conflict is an essential American national security priority. Two, he recognized that you can’t deal with this in year eight of a second term, but from day one. Three, you need to bring in some fresh people and ideas to do it.

…He had the right vision. He talked about the existential necessity for Israel of achieving a two-state solution, he understood that…that’s what it means to be a friend. He made the commitment to put it into action with a full-on settlement freeze and showed a real desire not just to speak but to act.

And that’s where the good news ends. The inevitability of an Israeli “no” to the concept of a settlement freeze was not fully [thought out]… The president backed down and became very defensive about its friendship with Israel rather than being on the offense and saying that friendship means pursuing a peace deal and providing military hardware, exercises and strategic operations – not just military aid.

At the end of the first term, the vision is unfulfilled, the tactics have not worked. If he is reelected, he has to press reset if he wants to achieve the vision he laid out at the beginning.

DS: J Street’s August poll of American Jews showed 57% who supported the broad outlines of a two-state solution package, but also 60% who feel favorably about Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has paid lip service, but not moved forward on the two-state solution. What’s going on among American Jews?

The biggest hurdle for the Israeli two-state camp and the American pro-Israel pro-peace camp is that people don’t believe there’s a way to get it done and a partner. But this is a far better situation to be in than the other way around. It’s a much harder task to change minds of the majority on the substance, than to mobilize people who agree with you.

The way to change the current situation is political leadership. Sadat changed public opinion overnight by speaking in the Knesset. Any one of the leaders in Ramallah, DC, Jerusalem stepping forward and leading on this issue will change the perception that [peace] is never going to happen. I have argued [this] to President Abbas …and to Israeli leaders who meet with us…to the White House, the President and will argue with whoever the American leader is after November. This is what will dissipate people’s doubts that [peace] can’t happen.

DS: J Street is committed to the two-state solution. Amos Oz said “[Israelis and Palestinian conflict resolution] is not a honeymoon, but a fair and painful divorce.” Isn’t this the old rhetoric? Is J Street being inflexible by not opening up different options?

This isn’t just a five or ten year old idea. For 80 years, there’s been no other realistic answer to how you resolve this conflict. You have two peoples, with an unbreakable claim on one piece of land. You have three options: a. one side wipes out the other, and controls all the land; b. you both continue to live there and continue to fight ad infinitum, with blood, tears, violence and war; c. you figure out a way to draw a line, and say you’re here, we’re there. For 80 years, it’s been really hard to figure out where that line is…but that doesn’t mean that we’re naïve to keep trying.

The other two outcomes are simply not acceptable. It may be academically interesting to debate…but the entirety of human history tells us that that’s not possible.

DS: Did J Street cut too far to the center/right? In trying too hard to please all, is its message getting diluted?

I am one-thousand percent convinced that two-thirds of Jewish Americans fall squarely in the middle of the political map which is the space that J Street is trying to claim. There is a very, very activist group on the right, a very, very activist group on the left, they are more passionate, they are louder, they are more intensely engaged in the debate, but ultimately, the power is going to belong to the center, which is rooted in Jewish values, committed to Israel, it wants peace….it [holds] liberal views on issues like human rights, civil rights, peace and democracy. That’s why we see our movement growing, expanding year to year.

DS: Why did you ask Obama not to oppose the UN resolution against settlements, but you opposed Palestine’s unilateral statehood bid? Were you influenced by the fallout against J Street following the UN settlement issue?

They’re completely different questions. If there was a United Nations resolution tomorrow on [settlement condemnation], we’d take the same exact position, which reflects American policy for over 40 years, to oppose the settlements over the Green Line.

The application for statehood is a separate question…This Administration was in line with United States policy, not against it, that the state of Palestine should be admitted [to the UN] as a result of a peace deal. We felt that jumping ahead to membership was just a symbolic statement. If Palestine had been admitted, today nothing would be different;[it] would not change the reality of occupation, of continued encroachment of settlements on land where they have to build their state.

DS: After inviting Peter Beinart as a central speaker at the conference, did you reject his views when they went too far?

I have absolutely no problem with his book. I am thrilled by the sense of urgency that he is infusing into the discussion, I am one-hundred percent supportive of his desire to rekindle a passionate liberal Zionism that unites our values and our love of the project of building a national home for our people. Does that mean that I’m going to agree with every single tactical recommendation he makes? No. Is he going to agree with all of ours? No, but that doesn’t influence the philosophical case we are making.

We are here to solve the broken dynamics of the American political system, and broken leadership of the established American Jewish community, which stakes out positions on Israel that are not in line with the American Jewish public,and represent a small hawkish part of it….We deserve to have all voices represented in the discussion.

It’s fine for some groups to [boycott settlement products], but it’s not our mission. Many people within J Street are not going to buy products made over the Green Line, spend a dollar or see a play in Ariel, because if you support J Street’s vision and you’re grounded in our values, you’re probably not going to buy those products, or attend the plays. But we’re not going to endorse that.

DS: You are both a political lobby but also committed to pushing the boundaries of the conversation among American Jewry. Is there any tension or contradiction between these?

We have a single mission – to advance American support for a two-state solution…The broader the conversation in the Jewish community on Israel, the healthier that community will be. I’ve never staked out any claim or made any pretense that J Street is left of center or far left, other people have tried to paint us that way or marginalize us, but since day one, we’ve been passionate moderates.

DS: What are your next steps?

In 2012, the campaign is the future of “pro-Israel”: to help define “pro-Israel” in American politics so that it doesn’t mean this downward spiral of ever-more hawkish pronouncements by politicians who think they’re currying favor and support from Jewish communities. We have to make clear that the future of “pro-Israel” in this country is to support the necessary moves to achieve a two state solution…We want Obama, or the next leader, to know that the politics support them in doing that.

DS: What would you see as short-term and long-term achievements?

This is a marathon [disclosure: Jeremy is a multi-marathon runner - ds]. When we created J Street, we thought there was a possibility that Obama would sprint forward and maybe get to a two-state solution within his first two years. We wanted to clear the political space, be the “blocking back” for him. That was J Street 1.0. When that didn’t work, it became very clear that we are absolutely in a marathon and to win we’re going to have to do the hard and slow work, community by community, synagogue by synagogue, member of Congress by member of Congress…

It’s amazing to see yearly growth, we have the 5000 students involved in J Street U after just two years; there were 650 students at the conference… The progress on Capitol Hill has been enormous. There are dozens [of members] today who are engaged and openly have a relationship with us. If you can continue at that rate, every year you add 10-20 more members, that’s real progress.

DS: Are there any possible ripple effects beyond the direct impact of J Street?

If voices to our left can get more organized and bring in more activists, that’s good for the Jewish community to have this argument about what their values mean. I hope people who disagree with us on the left won’t just confine their critiques to internet but get off their seats and do something.

That’s the hard work. It’s much easier to sit at home and lob criticism through blogs and tweets, and by posting that this isn’t changing the world overnight. But political change happens one step at a time, one foot in front of the other to reach the finish line of the marathon. If you’re sitting on the sidelines critiquing the runners, I have no respect for you. Get in the race, show you can run it faster, show you can get to the finish line, prove you have better ideas, but don’t put your energy into simply critiquing the form and style of other runners.

Read also:
Why I am proud of my work for J Street
J Street third annual conference marks shift to the right
What’s wrong with J Street – an open letter to members
WATCH: Why does a Palestinian speak at a J Street conference?

A majority of Israelis do not believe Israel will undertake a unilateral strike: 56 percent  believe that the chances of Israel doing it are low or non-existent (just 35 percent give it high chances).

The results confirm those cited by Larry Derfner last week, reporting on a new survey by Shibley Telhami at the University of Maryland, conducted by Dahaf Research (the sample was 500 Israelis, with a 4.3 percent margin of error – taken from 22-26 February). That study showed 19 percent who favored a unilateral attack, when given three options (unilateral, a joint strike with the United States – 42 percent – or no strike at all, 34 percent). It’s important to note that the Peace Index does not indicate a sudden rise in support from 19 percent to 31 percent, because the questions were asked in very different ways (in Telhami’s survey, there was one question with three options as described above; in the Peace Index, each option – unilateral, or a joint strike – was given a separate question and a full scale from strong to weak opposition or support). And it should be noted that 62 percent of Israelis (including 47 percent of Arab respondents) favor a joint strike in the Peace Index.

The two surveys do show that a stable one-third of Israeli society is opposed to any form of a strike, including joint American-Israeli action: 34 percent of the full sample of the Peace Index oppose a strike, the same as the 34 percent of Israelis who opposed the strike in Telhami’s study. Note that among Arab respondents, 51 percent in the Peace Index are opposed to a strike in any form (31 percent of the Jews). Also note that one third of the population is greater than the percentage who usually consider themselves left-wing in surveys of the Jewish population in Israel today – possibly more than twice as many).

The question remains – what’s behind these numbers, what’s going on in the minds of Israelis? Are they reasoning or panicking? Here are some more numbers to give insight, that I collected for my recent column in the Jerusalem Report:

…the mantra of a nuclear Iran may be losing its scare power: A 2009 survey by the Center for Iran Studies at Tel Aviv University found that while 81% believed Iran would succeed in building the bomb, just 23% would consider leaving as a result and this dropped to 11% in a late 2011 Haaretz poll. A 2009 poll for the Institute for National Security Studies showed that 79% do not believe Iran will attack Israel, and 80% do not think their lives will change if Iran has the bomb; since [2000], increasing numbers believe Israel is able to cope with a nuclear attack [by an enemy state], reaching [a peak of] 67% in 2009. Even more striking, the percentage of Israelis supporting a pre-emptive attack on Iran has fallen sharply – from 59% in the 2009 INSS survey to 41% in the Haaretz poll.”

So, before Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak undertook the current campaign to make a strike the number one priority, Israelis were busy trying to believe what Zionism said they were supposed to: that the state has provided sufficient security to handle existential threats without going on the warpath and putting its citizens at greater risk. It seems like the ones who really don’t believe in Zionism are its so-called defenders – if they must generate wars to rally citizens around the cause.

But perhaps the bottom line reasons why Israelis are decidedly more doubtful than their leaders about starting a war are the benefits they doubt and the price they know they’ll pay.

Fifty-one percent – a clear majority over those who think otherwise, in Telhami’s research believe that the ensuing war following an Israeli strike would last months or years, rather than days or weeks (37 percent); 44 percent say that the strike would also strengthen the Iranian government (four percent say it would have no effect, or 48 percent combined – that’s a statistical tie compared to 45 percent who say it might weaken the regime). Further, 68 percent are convinced that Hezbollah will join in with Iran’s war effort even if Israel attacks only Iran. And 60 percent in the Peace Index are convinced that the cost will involve far more than Ehud Barak’s promise of “only 500 casualties.”

It seems that that unlike their leaders, the Israeli people are calculating low or doubtful benefits, and high-to-intolerable costs. That’s called rational thinking, at least on this issue. Perhaps the government should consider it.

A recent poll, done for the Knesset channel and posted on the rightwing Srugim site,  52 percent of the Israeli public supports the law, and only 31 oppose it – not very different from the majority the law received in the Knesset. In that sense, the Israeli Parliament members represent their voters perfectly.

Srugim didn’t provide the data for the poll or the original questions asked, so we should take these numbers with a grain of salt. Also, the polls was apparently done in the morning following the vote, so the results might change with time.

According to the poll 43 percent of the public think the law will hurt Israel’s image in the world.

I have a hard time believing that the poll is “enough to be representative” as the authors claim. The sample size is of course not as important as the correct demographic and geographic distribution. Maybe that’s why the authors don’t provide a margin of error (my guess, at the very least: around +/- 7%).

And yet, it is data – think of it as a small peephole into a very big room.

The authors offer their summary of the main findings, which I have summarized even more concisely here:

This is not an Islamic uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood is “approved” by just 15%, and its leaders get barely 1% in a presidential straw vote…

…the peace treaty with Israel, more support it (37%) than oppose it (22%). Only 18% approve of either Hamas or Iran. And a mere 5% say the uprising occurred because the regime is “too pro‐Israel.”

El Baradei has very little popular support in a presidential straw vote (4%), far outpaced by Amr Musa (29%). But Mubarak and Omar Suleiman each get 18%.

A narrow plurality (36% vs. 29%) say Egypt should have good relations with the U.S….

Those are the authors’ observations. Here are mine:

1. A very clear plurality says this uprising is about internal domestic issues – economic woes and corruption (22% and 21% say those are the number one reasons, respectively). The next highest reason is “unemployment” – just 4% say “the regime is not Islamic enough” is their top reason.

2. When asked who should be the next President, the top answer with 33% of the votes is: Don’t know (19%) or refused to answer (14%). Many of the sensitive political questions in this survey show similarly high levels of “don’t know” – that’s a typical sign of people who are afraid to say their views for fear of some form of retribution. Given what we’ve seen in the streets, it would be hard to imagine that very many people don’t have a view.

3. The American administration fares unambiguously poorly; even in an imperfect sample, when 53% say they disapprove and just 17% approve, it’s safe to say the respondents were truly disappointed with “how President Obama handled the crisis.”

4. By a 10-point lead, respondents preferred to keep the treaty with Israel, rather than annul it (37% to 27%). The intensity showed a similar pattern: 26% strongly oppose annulling the treaty; 15% strongly support it.

5. When asked if they support the government in Iran, the Hamas leadership in Gaza, the Tunisian uprising against Ben Ali, and – interestingly – the referendum in Southern Sudan – large portions ranging from one-quarter to over 40% said they don’t know (in some cases, this was the plurality response). Understanding those respondents is key to learning which way society will tilt in the coming phase. But they definitely, clearly do not feel free yet. (On those issues mentioned here, the majority of those with an opinion disapproved.)

The next few hours could tell us much more than the polls. Overall, the data here affirms what much commentary has said: the revolt is secular leaning, driven by economic and internal discontent and dislike for everything associated with the Mubarak regime – more than radical religious anything. America and Israel might now realize that choosing bad friends for short-term reasons has long-term consequences.

Most notably – with so much fear and self-censorship burned into people’s minds, it will take a long time until the people in Tahrir Square feel genuinely liberated.

All the data comes from sources I trust. I use names or abbreviations of the surveys, and full information about each is at the end of this post, with links where possible – there’s plenty more on most topics that might interest readers of this post. Since I’m drawing from different surveys, the questions are not identical on both sides, but just a very small, rough sample to illustrate some points.

The Israeli Palestinian Conflict and Negotiations

Support for negotiations remains high among both societies, which directly contradicts the behavior of their leaders.

>>Sixty-nine percent of Palestinians support reaching a peace agreement with Israel; 31% oppose it (NEC, 12/10). This is ten points higher than the level of support in July (59%) and fairly average for the monthly polling starting in 2007 (support ranges from 84% to 51% at its lowest).

>>Seventy percent of the Israeli public supported the bilateral negotiations in October (Peace Index, 10/12)
Think of these next two pieces of data as illustrating each public’s willingness to some things that it would take to actually advance negotiations.

>>Sixty-two percent of Palestinians called on Hamas to change its position toward the elimination of Israel. This finding fluctuates just a little, and does not show a clear trend from 2007 onward – when 61% felt this way. (NEC, 12/10)

>>Palestinians increasingly support the relatively moderate leadership of Salam Fayyad over Hamas: Nearly seven in ten (69%) of Palestinians now say Salam Fayyad is the legitimate government of the Palestinian territories (a straight and steady rise from 62% in October, and the highest since NEC began testing him in 2007) –the percentage who chose Ismail Hanieh’s government has dropped from 15% in October to 10% (one-fifth believe neither are legitimate). (NEC, 12/10)

>>Sixty percent of Israeli Jews would freeze settlements either completely or outside the large settlement blocs, compared to 33% who would allow unlimited construction (seven percent don’t know) – three-quarters of Israel’s Palestinian citizens call for a total settlement freeze.  (JIPP, 11/10)

>>Israelis are willing to negotiate with Hamas (50%) and many would dismantle most settlements for an agreement (43%). But far fewer believe that the majority of Israelis support each of these policies (24% and 29%, respectively). That means that even if they support such steps, they don’t believe their compatriots feel the same way – which might discourage them from speaking out about it. (JIPP, 11/10)

>>And regarding the solution to the conflict? JIPP meticulously and thoroughly tests each aspect of a Clinton+Geneva+Saudi Plan-based agreement, then tests the whole package at the end. The result: 52% of Israelis (and 51% of Israeli Jews) approve it; 40% of Palestinians do. Thirty-nine percent of Israelis are opposed compared to 58% of Palestinians are.

Democracy, Racism, anti-Democratic Trends

Israel

Even Jeffrey Goldberg is finally worried:

“But I’ve had a couple of conversations this week with people…that suggest to me that democracy is something less than a religious value for wide swaths of Israeli Jewish society. I’m speaking here of four groups…The haredim, the ultra-Orthodox Jews…; the working-class religious Sephardim… represented in the Knesset by the obscurantist rabbis of the Shas Party; the settler movement…; and the million or so recent immigrants from Russia, who support, in distressing numbers, the Putin-like Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s foreign minister and leader of the “Israel is Our Home” party.”

With all due respect, who has Goldberg not been talking to? Pollsters, clearly. 2010 will be remembered as the year of the shocking (sometimes purposely so) polls showing major erosion in support for basic democratic values, from freedom of speech to equal representation or voting rights for citizens. Every few months some terrible numbers appeared but Goldberg seems to have missed some of the most important trends: young people, for example, are nowhere on his list although they are an unmistakable force behind the non- or anti-democratic sentiments. This is not only due to demographic growth among Haredim. Also: not only Russian immigrants put Lieberman in power – good old (or young) Sabras were there for him too, giving him over one-third of his party’s vote.

Here is a selection of data on democracy, racism and equality in Israel.

Israelis:

>> Thirty-nine percent of all Israelis support the call of rabbis in Safed not to rent apartments to Arabs (oops, I almost made a typo and wrote “Jews”). A 54% majority are opposed. Among Jews, the split is 44% (support) to 48% (opposed). (JIPP, 12/10)

>>Fifty-five percent of Israeli Jews support a law requiring all immigrants to swear allegiance to a Jewish and democratic state; six percent support it for non-Jewish immigrants only and ten percent actually support it for Jewish immigrants only; just over one-quarter oppose it altogether. (JIPP 12/10). This question was irresponsibly misreported in Haaretz today, where in one graph, the text read: “55% support the law of the loyalty oath to a Jewish and democratic state.” The article text reported simply that 55% support the law requiring immigrants to swear allegiance, ignoring the helpful nuances that the (more responsible) poll authors developed in this question.

>>Jewish Israelis break dead even on support or opposition to a law that allows committees to determine admission to communities based on “character” – which most assume means allowing them to discriminate against Arabs. 40% support this and 40% are opposed (three percent opposed it if the law allows discrimination against Arabs, five percent oppose it if it allows discrimination against religious people; 13% didn’t know). (JIPP, 12/10)

>>The principle of equality before the law is hanging on by a thread – a 51% majority of Israelis believe there should be full equality of rights for Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel” (Democracy Index, 2010)

Palestinians:

Democratic freedoms and liberal values are facing erosion among the Palestinians as well. (Ultimately, the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who tend to support such values most enthusiastically, may just end up being the most committed democrats between the Jordan and the sea).

In a fascinating (and very long) study on liberalism, the following question was asked in 2007 and in 2010: “Liberal political principles stand for civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness and the limited role of government. Do you approve or disapprove of this ideology?” In 2007, 66% (two-thirds) of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians approved this. In 2010, just 46% (keep in mind that people are also assessing the part of the question dealing with free market and limited government). (NEC Liberalism, 2010)

But when asked flat-out whether all people equal rights irrespective of religion, a strong 86% majority accepted this in 2007, with only a four-point drop (just over the margin of error) in 2010 to 82%. Those who reject this rose from 11% to 14%. (NEC Liberalism, 2010)

There are mixed feelings about democracy as a system of government for Palestine: 78% say it would be good – almost the same in total as in 2007. But there has been an eight-point drop in the percentage who say it is definitely good. Palestinians are not as certain democracy will work for them – 62% – both years believe that democracy could work, but again there has been a small drop in the percentage of those who are sure (from 20% to 15% in 2010). (NEC Liberalism, 2010)

Survey information:

NEC: Near East Consulting, under the direction of Jamil Rabah (his surveys are cited as “NEC”); the December survey:  5-7 December, n=850, margin of error: +/- 3.4%; the Liberalism study is called: “Liberalism: A survey on Public Perceptions Towards Liberal Values in Palestine.” It was commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and conducted by NEC in cooperation with Freedom Forum Palestine. 24 June – 4 July, 2010; n=1159 (margin of error not cited – unfortunately this is not yet available on line, but keep checking the NEC website). The July+October survey is here.

JIPP (December 2010): Ongoing polls authored by Khalil Shikaki and Jacob Shamir, longtime partners in the “Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll,” a joint project of the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University and the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (cited as JIPP). Israeli Poll #(34)21-30  Nov 2010; N=919 Jews and Arabs; Palestinian Poll #(38) Nov-Dec 2010; N=1270).

Peace Index (October 2010): Formerly of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, currently at the Israel Democracy Institute and together with the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution  at Tel Aviv University. 18-20 October, 2010, n=601 Jews and Arabs)

Israel Democracy Index (2010): Ongoing project of the Gutman Center at the Israel Democracy Institute: “Auditing Israeli Democracy: Democratic Values in Practice.” Authored by Asher Arian (z”l), Tamar Herman, Michael Philippov, Yuval Level, Hila Zaban and Anna Knafelman. Data collected March 2010, n= 1,200 Jews and Arabs; margin of error: +/-2.8%