Every day, truly scary signs of under-the-radar McCarthyism can be seen – just this morning Haaretz reported on the attempt to oust an official (Hebrew) in the Education Ministry responsible for civics education, who has come under a right-wing witch-hunt, despite protests by both left- and right-leaning colleagues. The legitimization of political persecution, combined with a pernicious tactic of hitting minor-seeming administrative, policy, and legislative targets, aids in the deception about the true effects of this government.

The Times is doing the right and responsible thing by reflecting this reality. However, I found three semi-small but semi-serious inaccuracies in the piece. They’re not flat-out errors so much as misleading points that paint a skewed picture of the debates they describe and it’s worth explaining them to limit any further confusion.

First, regarding the debate about the government’s failure to reach a new draft law, the article states:

…Mr. Mofaz proposed enlisting 80 percent of the ultra-Orthodox…Mr. Netanyahu sided with his right-wing allies and insisted on something more incremental. There was also talk of doubling army enlistment for Arabs. Israeli Palestinians are not required to join the army, and most do not. Many feel like second-class citizens and are deeply conflicted about their place in Israeli society.

This makes it sound like the debate about Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel revolves around them joining the army; it does not. The discourse is almost entirely about having them perform some form of national (including local, community) service. This is a critical difference and much nuance is lost by mis-characterizing the dilemma. Something like this would have been more accurate: “there has been talk of encouraging Israeli-Palestinians to perform some form of national civic or community service. The topic is highly sensitive because they feel like second-class citizens, but also stands to further their goal of economic and social integration – by contrast to the Haredi goal of isolation.”

Next, when addressing the demographic issues in Israel, the article states:

The Palestinian population is also expanding, hastening a day when Jews could be a minority.

For many readers, this statement conveys an unnecessary measure of racial fear, which is not only morally, but demographically unjustified: Palestinian citizens of Israel are about 20% of the population, and roughly 15% of the adult (voting) population. That’s too small to produce anything like an Arab-Palestinian majority any time soon, especially if the trend towards economic integration and female higher education continues – this will ultimately slow down traditionally high birthrates to significantly lower than those of Haredim, for example.

The only imminent scenario of a Palestinian majority is through the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. The article fails to make this distinction, which is imperative for readers to internalize.

The final problem is a description of Kadima’s role in the government that is uncritical and problematic at best:

Mr. Netanyahu’s past dependence on hard-line parties has manifested itself in aggressive settlement building and resistance to serious peace talks with the Palestinians — who themselves have not shown enough commitment to a solution. Without Kadima’s moderating force, these trends will continue.

“Moderating force” is indeed what Kadima would like its audiences and voters to think. But the last time Kadima was in power, it started two wars, failed at (admittedly serious) peace negotiations, and built or planned 9000 new homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Former party leader Tzipi Livni was complicit in the current government’s actions through her silence while in opposition; the current leader, Shaul Mofaz, may talk the two-state talk but there is little to nothing in the party’s record to indicate that it would do much to change the status quo.

Let the New York Times go one step further, and call things by their name instead of letting politicians mislead its readers.

Congratulations to Benjamin Netanyahu and Shaul Mofaz. I’ve been fond of Mofaz for a while now. Ever since he served as defense minister in Ariel Sharon’s government during the disengagement from Gaza, Mofaz has been building himself up as a serious politician and perhaps even a statesman. It was during the disengagement that Mofaz morphed into a political dove, and despite the takeover of Israeli politics by the right-wing settler movement, he has stood his ground.

Then in 2009, during a period of political stagnation, he introduced a gutsy plan for a peace process and when asked, did not rule out negotiating with Hamas. In his plan, Mofaz emphasized that “our control over another people, and the burden of responsibility and occupation, will come to an end in a clear and concrete way…” The plan also contains that magic number, the one that terrorizes Israeli politicians: ’67.

Shaul Mofaz, as a former IDF chief of staff, could have placed himself comfortably within the ideological zone of typical generals-cum-politicians – like Ehud Barak, Moshe (Bogi) Ya’alon and others – but he opted not to. In early 2011, even before the social protests, Mofaz began developing a plan for social-economic reforms with a team of eight young researchers from the economic, legal, and public policy spheres, led by Yishai Mishor. The plan called to increase in the employment of Israeli Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox, make higher education more accessible, offer housing solutions and a more equal health plan, and more.

In that plan, Mofaz did not shy away from slaughtering one of the most (un)sacred cows in Israel’s history: the defense budget. “As head of planning in the IDF, Chief of Staff, and Defense Minister, I have resolved that we can effectively decrease the defense budget by NIS 4 billion per year, without damaging the IDF’s readiness,” he said in an interview to TheMarker (Hebrew), an economic daily newspaper.

Quietly, step-by-step, Mofaz has also proved himself skilled at politics. In his first campaign for the leadership of his party, he lost the internal Kadima elections to Tzipi Livni by a slim margin. In the second recent round, he claimed victory in a knockout. While everyone eulogized him as the tragic future loser of the 2012 elections, he saved Kadima and himself, and prevented – together with Netanyahu – unnecessary elections, which ultimately would have maintained the status quo.

All the frustrated political opponents and journalists who feel “tricked” into believing that elections were around the corner are left with little to do but obsess about Mofaz’s “credibility” problem. He said he wouldn’t leave the Likud party, and he left. He said he wouldn’t join the Netanyahu government, and he joined.

But so what? Who cares if Mofaz is in Kadima or in Likud? What exactly is the difference between them anyway? What matters is policy, not politics, and Mofaz deserves credit as a politician with a clear-cut agenda. It’s only beneficial that as of today his agenda is now part of the coalition.

Up to now, former Kadima leader Tzipi Livni got the credit for being credible – because she did not join the Netanyahu government, refusing to give billions of shekels to the ultra-Orthodox. But Livni is the one who stole votes from the left with the Kadima campaign “Either Tzipi or Bibi” then did little as opposition; under her leadership Kadima was among the initiators of the “Boycott Law”; under her watch, Kadima initiated and helped pass a draconian amendment to the libel law and the selection committees law (which de facto prevents Arabs from living in certain communities) and let’s not forget the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. After repeatedly abusing and neglecting her role as opposition leader and misguiding her supporters, her bitter response to the Netanyahu-Mofaz move, would be outrageous, if it hadn’t been so insignificant.

Shelly Yacimovich and Yair Lapid are considered the two big losers from the coalition deal.  But neither has a sincere or bold agenda anyway. As an MK, Yacimovich has not touched upon the occupation, nor the peace process, the anti-democratic legislation, nor the Arab minority in Israel. She is a social-democrat whose emphasis on the democratic side of the equation is marginal. It’s not clear how she will promote significant economic changes, since she is unwilling to confront her stronghold of support, the Histadrut.  On the other hand, Yair Lapid brought no message at all to the table. Lapid is waning, without leaving a trace of policy or ideology on any issue.

Netanyahu and Mofaz can do great things in the coming year, ranging from legislating an alternative to the unsuccessful Tal Law for drafting Haredim into the army, through to the peace process, to which I believe Mofaz is sincerely committed. Yet the most significant change this duo can undertake is to break away from the suffocating grasp of the settler right, which is threatening to destroy Israeli democracy. This will be the real test for Netanyahu and Mofaz. The rest doesn’t matter nearly as much.

Roni Schocken is a candidate in the Tel Aviv-Berkeley LL.M. program (2012) and in the Harvard Business School MBA program (2014). He has clerked for the Supreme Court and served as the director of the government relations department in The Abraham Fund Initiatives.

The morning media conversations obsessed about what a horrible move this was, perhaps anti-democratic, a dirty trick (“nauseating” was a favored description) and, insisted one veteran Knesset television reporter, it tramples the will of the people.

I don’t trust the righteous anger on behalf of the people. The bitter accusations that this is a deal based on “personal interests” smack of bitter personal interests.

There are actually various reasons why this probably a good thing – or at least no worse than the (now counterfactual) potential results of an election.

1. The main towering advantage of postponing the elections until late 2013 is that it ensures only another year and a half of one of the worst governments Israel has ever had – a government that drove hundreds of thousands to the streets in economic desperation, pushed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict past the point of no return, and explicitly set out to mutilate Israel’s democratic process and what remained of its democratic character. If elections were held in four months, all polls bar none showed a resounding Likud victory, the same majority for the right-wing bloc, and ergo – probably a very similar government for another four years. Whatever terrible damage a super-sized coalition majority can do – it’s better to have this for 18 months, than for up to four more years.

2. The elections were designed to usurp another social protest, with the one-year anniversary coming up. I don’t know what kind of showing the public will or won’t make – but now there can be no excuse that the elections are a replacement for protest. Further, the social protesters made colorful headlines but bad politicians. After nearly a year, not a single grassroots party has emerged fully-baked for elections, unless one counts silver-spoon Yair Lapid. Truly new political formations apparently need the extra year and a half to organize.

3. With apologies to all the commentators who see themselves as valiant voices of the public, I didn’t need recent surveys to tell me that the majority (62 percent in a Channel 2 survey just last week – Hebrew) didn’t want elections. The social protesters, to my dismay, were not revolutionaries: they clung to Netanyahu for his full-on go-nowhere status quo approach on the conflict, and just needed him to move over a little to the left on social-economic issues, because in their minds, well-being and the conflict are completely unrelated. It’s hard to see how the deal is anti-democratic, with the two largest parties in the Knesset leading the country (however much I personally dislike them). Kadima’s low poll scores should not be confused with the 2009 election results.

4. Labor now has the chance to show if it’s made of anything – by reviving the phantom opposition. I admit that I’ve been skeptical of new party leader Shelly Yacimovich; while she has branded herself successfully as an active parliamentarian on social/economic themes, I think anyone who doesn’t keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict front and center on the Israeli priorities is doing a historical disservice to the country, its people and the region. Tzipi Livni was a profound disappointment as opposition leader. Not only was she complicit in the government’s ruinous behavior by her silence, but under her leadership, the party initiated some of the worst anti-democratic legislation. For three years, Israel has had no opposition; Labor is now positioned to revive the concept.

5. Iran: Some of my colleagues think that this is a launching platform for a strike on Iran. I don’t agree – Netanyahu had all the platform he needed in Israel before this too, and if anything, Mofaz has been cautious about the Iran strike. (Although why believe anything he says anymore? He also called Netanyahu a flat-out liar and said he would never go into a coalition with him.) The point is, sadly, I don’t think the prospects are changed. Israel will have to come to its senses with or without the kumbaya coalition.

There are alas many dangers and outrages involved in this development too. I’ll bet anything the new government will continue to authorize settlement expansion, and legalize unlawful West Bank neighborhoods slated for evacuation. Further, I loathe the feeling of a male takeover: Livni out, Kadima in, Shelly snuffed out, and not to mention that the whole deal was facilitated by the prime minister’s crony Natan Eshel, who recently left office in the wake of a sexual harassment scandal.

But this government’s days are limited.