A review of public surveys on the Iran issue shows that even prior to the damning critique on Friday by Yuval Diskin, former head of the Internal Security Agency, the public already diverged sharply from the leadership’s policy: Survey after survey, as I wrote in March, showed that only a minority – somewhere between 19 percent and 31 percent – favors a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran. The majority – at least half (here’s a similar survey in Hebrew), and up to nearly two-thirds (Hebrew) – is against a unilateral attack.

There are a few reasons why Diskin’s words could open a crack in the myth among the public that Netanyahu is good for security: First, Diskin voices the public’s basic divergence with government policy, as stated above. Second, Diskin joins a growing list of senior security figures who have expressed reservations about an attack, and that’s hard for the public to ignore. Third, commentary and speculation from some of the most influential (and most importantly, non-left wing) opinion-forming columnists in the Hebrew press have largely defended Diskin’s integrity.

At the very least, Diskin’s words and their reverberations could raise reasonable doubt in the public mind about Netanyahu’s competence on security. If so, citizens may then re-visit their own positions, instead of placing unqualified trust in the government. And if the public looks at itself, here’s what it will see (this revisits the polls I wrote about in March):

• Just one-fifth of all Israelis (22 percent) – and only 19 percent of Jews – believe that a strike would delay the nuclear program by five years or more. All the rest believe it would delay it only by one to five years (31 percent). Some think it would actually accelerate the program (11 percent) and one-fifth (19 percent) say it would have no effect at all. (Telhami)
• Three-quarters of Israelis believe that if Israel strikes, a major war would erupt in the Middle East. (Truman)
• Half the population believes that the ensuing conflict would last months or years; nearly half believes it could strengthen the Iranian government; and almost 70 percent (actually, a full three-quarters among Jewish respondents) believe that Hezbollah would join a retaliatory effort by Iran. (Telhami)

One newer survey showed quite different results – and it’s one of the more biased reports I’ve seen, by the usually-respectable Camil Fuchs (who polls for Haaretz). The survey was conducted on behalf of the right-wing Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, an outfit which helped found NGO Monitor, is headed by Dore Gold and has Gerald Steinberg (the head of NGO Monitor) on its list of fellows. The respondents are Jews only; remarkably, the sample contains a disproportionate number of ultra-Orthodox (see the survey information notes, below). The survey stated hawkish positions and asked people to agree or disagree, rather than presenting two opposing views and asking them to state a preference. According to the data:

• When told that “The only way to stop Iran from becoming nuclear is through a military strike,” 60 percent agreed (37 percent disagreed).
• When told that “Israel will pay a higher price for living under the shadow of an Iranian bomb than it will for attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities,” 65 percent agreed (the question did not clarify whether the attack would be unilateral or in concert with any other actor).
• But when asked to compare American versus Israeli military capacity to substantially harm Iran’s nuclear program, the gap becomes apparent even here: 87 percent agreed that America has this capacity, compared to 66 percent who agreed with relation to Israel.

Close monitoring is needed, but the public has spoken clearly against an Israeli unilateral strike and knows categorically that it will cause a major, protracted war. Personally I’d be happier if the numbers showed more doubts about a military strike in general.

But when surveys prior to Diskin’s critique repeatedly show Netanyahu and Likud running high, affirmed again by a survey published today in the pro-Netanyahu daily paper Israel Hayom (a classic case of shoddy poll reporting, free of sample size, description and dates), and the New York Times called Netanyahu’s popularity “all but impenetrable,” it’s clear that the venting of economic frustrations last summer never touched the current government. A crack in the armor of Netanyahu/Barak’s security defense (of themselves, that is) is probably the only thing that stands to chip away at their support.

 Survey Information:

• Telhami: Survey authored by Professor Shibley Telhami at University of Maryland. Dates: February 22-26, 2012. Sample: 500 adult Israelis, national representation (Jews and Arabs); error: +/- 4.5%
• Truman: Survey authored by Professor Yaacov Shamir as part of the Israel-Palestine poll project at the Truman Institute at Hebrew University. Dates: March 11-15, 2012. Sample: 600 adult Israelis, national representation (Jews and Arabs), interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic, Russian; error: +/- 4.5%
• Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Authored by Camil Fuchs, March 2011 (no precise dates given). Sample: 505 Jews, no margin of error given. Sample critique: the demographics show that 15% of the sample self-defined as Haredi (ultra-orthodox), the most right-leaning group in Israel – and the group with the highest support for an attack. I have never seen statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics or in any survey I’ve conducted that shows their number higher than nine percent. The report says the numbers in the analysis are weighted according to CBS data; but since Haredim invariably under-respond to surveys, the sample is quite hard to explain.

Correction appended: Nearly half the Israeli public believes a strike on Iran would strengthen the Iranian government, not the Israeli government as originally written.

Here’s a selection of data from a few recent surveys of the Israeli and Palestinian publics, showing the same old story: support for negotiations, some concessions and an agreement, which won’t happen and won’t bear fruit. In the future, I’d like to see more detailed public discussion of new stories.

I’ve used initials for poll citations – and full survey information, with links, is available at the end.

The Good News:

Caveat: this is good if you’re a supporter of TSS (the two-state solution), and a fan of OP/CGP (Oslo Process/Clinton Geneva Parameters) – the “bad news” below relates to that approach as well. That’s because two of the survey series’ I report on here – The Peace Index and the Joint Israel-Palestinian Polls (both conducted surveys in December) – are rooted in these paradigms and faithfully track attitudes on a range of detailed positions regarding TSS.

So, for example, 65% of the Israeli public supports negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians at this time (Jews more than Arabs, but still a majority of both populations, PI). Further, 60% thinks the government should make a special effort to renew negotiations given the specific circumstances at this time.

This number has been generally consistent for years now. So sure, it’s encouraging, but if the government routinely ignores it, how relevant is public opinion on this issue?

A close observer might note that negotiations were held (among negotiators, not politicians) this week in Amman. But he or she would have to be a very, very close observer – perhaps with bionic vision – to have noticed the talks in Israel, since the Israeli press hardly covered them at all. I can’t find one informed person who viewed them as anything other than diplomatic window-dressing. I would love to be proven wrong.

There is evidence that if serious negotiations were to produce an agreement, support for a final status package is on the rise. The JIPP poll shows that 58% of Israelis and 50% of Palestinians surveyed in mid-December support an overall final status package along the lines of the Clinton parameters. The authors are happy about these modest numbers, because they indicate the first time both sides show majority support since 2004.

There was also some rise in support for most of the basic elements of the plan on both sides. However, as always, the items about Jerusalem and refugees fail to gain majority support from either side: 42% and 45% of Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, support the 5-option refugee compromise, and 38% and 40%, respectively, support the basic divide-Jerusalem compromise.

Once upon a time, before the Camp David negotiations in 2000, these were breakthrough numbers. I do believe that if an agreement were on the table, with both leaders boldly prepared to sign and strong third-party backing, the numbers would inch towards a majority and in any case, support for the whole package would be clear. But without leadership, the public won’t rise up and demand something it doesn’t truly want.

So now, the numbers have become the symbol of stagnation. Why?

The Bad News

The strong majority of both populations support the conditions that are preventing negotiations: 78% of Palestinians support President Mahmoud Abbas’ precondition that Israel must freeze settlements before entering negotiations, in the JIPP survey (which is far more support than Abbas has overall – in a November JMCC poll, 55% of Palestinian approve of his leadership, a sharp drop from the Israel Project survey in July, pre-September UN bid). In other words, this policy may be one of the strongest ones Abbas has left to maintain public support for his leadership right now.

Further, 69% of Israelis reject Abbas’ demand – in other words, they support Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position that negotiations should not be held with Palestinian preconditions (JIPP). And 51% of Israelis (although only 33% of Arabs) approve of how Netanyahu’s government is handling the conflict (PI).

This is incontrovertible evidence that the Israeli public has no interest in pressuring its government to negotiations that have any potential for leading to a two-state solution. One might say the same about Palestinians, but it really is hard to see the logic of negotiating for a pie that will be all gone at the end of the talks.

And in other news:

But perhaps questions about the old peace paradigms from the last two decades aren’t as relevant as they once were. Israelis mostly seem intent on maintaining the status quo. Palestinians seem to be waiting-and-seeing whether there will be increasing de facto acceptance of the statehood they requested in September, from key global actors or forums.

There is more talk in the air about a one-state solution/reality/dream/nightmare than I ever remember in the past. Figures on the mainstream left in Israel, who staked their entire political identity on the TSS, are increasingly raising this possibility. Some right-wing Israelis have their own version of one state. Some Palestinians – activists and leaders – have discussed it for years.

At present, polls on the Palestinian side are contradictory and inconclusive: the JMCC survey shows that twice as many Palestinians, and an absolute 54% majority, choose two states, over 22% who prefer a single bi-national state – similar numbers are seen in past JIPP polls. But the TIP poll shows that a 52% majority (or 66% depending on how the question was asked) sees the ultimate goal as a single Palestinian state. TIP did not ask about a binational state with equal rights for all.

It isn’t as easy to find Israeli polling data about the one-state option. But the Truman Institute JIPP series provides one survey from March 2010 with useful data: just one-quarter (24%) of Israelis supported one state back then (that survey showed 29% of Palestinians who supported it). But there was one follow up question, with an interesting result: when asked about two states, with some joint institutions leading to some sort of confederation, 30% of the Israeli public supported it, six points higher than those who supported one single state.

********

There is a plethora of data about old paradigms, but it’s hard to find anyone – analysts and policy elites, or the public itself on either side, who believes they still work. And there is a paucity of information about any new or different approaches – one state, a confederation, the mechanics and character of various political configurations, shared institutions, separate symbols. Instead of tracking a few percentage points shifting around the old paradigms, I’d like to see more data showing how much either public will consider new ones.

Survey citations:

PI: 5-6 December, 2011. N=616.

JIPP: Palestinian sample: December 15-17, 2011 (WB/G/East Jerusalem). n=1270, error: +/- 3%, face-to-face. Jewish sample: 11-14 December, n=605, Hebrew/Arabic/Russian, error: +/- 4.5%.

JIPP: 4-6 March 2010, n= 1270.

TIP survey: Jun 20 – 8 July 2011. N=1010 (WB/G).

JMCC survey. 17-20 November, 2011. N=1200, face-to-face.

Israel Hayom is Israel’s most widely read Hebrew-language newspaper. It is distributed for free on street corners throughout the country and is owned by American businessman Sheldon Adelson, who maintains a cozy relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On Friday the 25th, Israel Hayom ran the following:

Israel Hayom survey on preventing a nuclear Iran (photo: Screen shot / www.israelhayom.co.il)

The headline reads: In your opinion, would steps implemented by the Western countries prevent Iran from creating a nuclear weapon?

This question seems, to me, a bit vague. What are the steps? Economic sanctions? A military attack? But the point here is Israel Hayom‘s graphic and the way it seeks to manufacture an appearance of consensus–that is, consensus with Netanyahu and Barak’s hopes to strike Iran.

The results of the survey, below the frightening graphic of a mushroom cloud:

41.3% Yes

48.6% No

10% I don’t know

While the majority responded “No,” it is indicated by the short green bar. The long blue bar–blue being a patriotic color in a country where the flag is blue and white–represents those who think that “steps” would prevent Iran from creating a nuclear weapon.

Those who bother reading the numbers will realize, of course, that the bar graph is misleading. But those who simply glance at it might not. Further, the visual of that long, blue bar next to the word yes is powerful, even if one reads the numbers–it creates a feeling of national consensus that “steps” are the way to go when it comes to Iran.

Or, maybe, it was just a big typo…?

For background and related posts on +972:
Is Israel preparing an assault against Iran? The media is ready
Bloggingheads: Will Israel strike Iran?
Israeli public, politicians split on Iran (with advantage to skeptics)
Finally, Iran plan wakes Israel up to “the Israeli threat”

In my assessment, the government vote is a pretty good indicator of how the public feels at this moment: 10% against the deal, and the rest – 90% for it.

The public mobilization for Schalit has been massive. There has hardly been a single major public forum that has not been leveraged to call for Schalit’s release. The family of the kidnapped soldier has been ubiquitous – and tireless. Most heart-wrenching is the unflagging effort of his parents, brother and friends, who have spent their days in a tent, traveling, talking, always and to everyone – neither sleep nor slumber for them in the pursuit of their son.

As a result, Schalit has become the pan-Israel cause, one of the single most unifying factors felt in the Israeli discourse today.

And yet, the last time a deal was really in the air, there was far more talk of the very deep dilemma posed by such a deal. It was December, 2009, and I tested the weighty arguments for and against a prisoner deal for my column in the Jerusalem Report (the original column is not available on-line). Overall, support was high at the time: a Panels internet survey for Channel 2, from March 2009, showed 67% support for his release in return for prisoners “with blood on their hands.” In my column, I observed that:

In a dispassionate analysis, the list of pros and cons for a Schalit deal practically balance each other out. In this context, public opinion could be viewed as the deal-breaker. And public opinion is not dispassionate.

Past surveys show clear support for previous deals: In the Tami Steinmetz War and Peace Index from late June 2008, 71 percent of the Jewish population supported releasing “hundreds if not more” prisoners for Schalit, and only 21% opposed (the gap was even slightly larger when Arab respondents were included). In the same survey, 61% supported the release of terrorists, including the infamous Samir Kuntar, with only 31% opposed, in exchange for soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, who were presumed dead in Lebanon. The same figure of 61% was confirmed by a Dahaf poll published in the Hebrew mass daily Yedioth Ahronoth at around the same time.

But when faced with the weighty arguments presented in a balanced way in our survey, the public was far more divided, and only a plurality, not a majority, supported it. In the telephone survey of 500 Israeli Jews from 8-9 December 2009, I asked:

If the state does not save each captured soldier, even by releasing many terrorists, Israelis are likely to lose faith that the state will back up IDF soldiers.” – OR “If the state saves all captives by freeing many terrorists, it encourages kidnappings in the future and the state thereby endangers the lives of IDF soldiers in the future.” [People had to choose which view is closer to their own]

… Some 46% of respondents, not quite an absolute majority, felt closer to the view that if the state fails to save a soldier, they might lose faith that the state will back up IDF soldiers in general. Nearly one-third (31%) were more concerned that a deal means the state is endangering soldiers in the future. Those who chose the option favoring a deal showed more intensity – they agreed much more with that sentence, at twice the rate of those who agreed much more with the sentence focused on the dangers of a deal – 33% to 17%. Nine percent felt both to be true, and another 12% could not decide at all between them.

Some demographic groups showed surprising trends. Young people were less worried that failure to cut a deal indicated the state forsaking its soldiers than older respondents: 42% under the age of 55 chose the pro-deal option, while among respondents over the age of 55, half chose the pro-deal option. Haredim showed the greatest support for the sentence against a deal – 52 said that saving soldiers might encourage future kidnappings – Jerusalem and West Bank residents showed a similar trend, where over 50% supported the statement that a deal would endanger soldiers in the future, and fewer who chose the pro-deal option.

At this point, I believe the public has completely dropped its doubts. The emotional factor has taken over.

In June 2010, at the four year mark, a Channel 10-Nana survey showed that 66% felt the government wasn’t doing enough to achieve his release, and 53% supported a deal that would free 1,000 prisoners and 100 with blood on their hands. One-third opposed it, and 13% were unable or unwilling to decide.

While activists for his release never let up, this year seems to have seen heightened activity and perhaps even higher consciousness. A television drama about the moment of his kidnapping grabbed attention – before it was shown, 59% said they had heard of it, and 70% of survey respondents who had heard about it said they planned to watch.

Then in June, 2011 – five years since Schalit was kidnapped, a survey showed 63% support for releasing him at a price of 1,000 prisoners, 450 with blood on their hands. Thus, support has gone up and down, and people respond to nuances – but there has always been high support and desire for this deal.

Beyond the numbers, he is a symbol. As Noam Schalit said to the cameras and microphones late Tuesday night, this is a symbolic day. Symbols unite people and now hardly anyone is asking about the repercussions of the deal – except the government nay sayers.

And on the practical level, my own opinion remains what it was back then:

The bitter reality is that Palestinians who pose a security threat but are currently incarcerated in Israel prisons are merely “spare parts” in the machine of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this deflates the security argument. [It’s] this conflict [that] generates terror, not the prisoner releases. If they stay in jail, someone else will do their job…

Today I say – let him out, and end the conflict.

This post has been updated, 9:30am, 12 October, 2011

Whether or not American Presidents have said it, the Israeli public could not have been surprised – as the notion has been on the table very explicitly over the last decade. Further, numerous polls have tested various formulations. Below is a selection of data – chosen at random, from readily available sources, over the last decade.

*For readers’ convenience, I have left out the detailed survey information, but all the links provide the full surveys and all the relevant methodological information.

—————

March 2002: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) Peace Index
“In light of the severe security situation, there are two possible extreme solutions: transfer of the residents of the territories, or withdrawal to the 1967 lines and settlement evacuation. Which would you choose?”

Jewish sample:

•    Transfer: 29%
•    Withdrawal to 1967: 35%
•    Neither serves Israel’s interests: 29%

July 2002: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) Peace Index

“If in the framework of this agreement, the Palestinians give up on the right of return, would you support or oppose a return to the 1967 borders, with adjustments to allow the major settlement blocs to remain under Israeli control?

Jewish sample:

•    Support: 48%
•    Oppose: 54%

(percentages add up to more than 100% due to rounding)

November 2002: Search for Common Ground survey

Jewish Sample:

•    51% “Favor a Palestinian State based on ‘67 borders, if Palestinians commit to stop using violence”

•    21% oppose this, only because they do not believe Palestinians will stop using violence, not because they believe Israel should maintain its hold on the territories.

February 2003: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) Peace Index

“Would you accept the establishment of an independent, viable Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with certain agreed border adjustments?

Jewish Sample:

•    Accept: 58%
•    Reject: 37% (Jewish and Arab sample: 61% accept, 34% reject)

May 2003: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) Peace Index

Recently, the press reported a peace plan between Israel and the Palestinians called the “Road Map.” The main points of the plan are: in the first stage, the Palestinians will elect a new leadership and a new leader, Abu Mazen, which has been done. The Palestinian leadership will declare unilaterally Israel’s right to exist, and will undertake all means to stop the terror and violence against Israel, including stopping incitement against it. At the same time, Israel will withdraw from the areas it re-entered following the Intifada, dismantle all the illegal strongholds, freeze settlement building and will stop military activities against the Palestinians.

In the second phase, at the start of 2004, a Palestinian state will be established with temporary borders. During this same year, Israel and the Palestinians will conduct negotiations toward a final peace accord that will include reaching a solution on the main points of disagreement, such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that will live in peace alongside Israel, based on the 1967 borders, with some adjustments.

Jewish Sample:

•    59% support (the whole plan)
•    39% oppose
(61% support, 36% oppose, from the whole population)

December 2003: Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace. Joint Israel Palestinian Poll (JIPP)

(Note: This ongoing survey, undertaken among Israelis and Palestinians several times a year, began asking the following formulation and has asked it regularly up to recent polls. It does not mention the explicit term “1967 borders with adjustments,” but the wording amounts to the same concept. The question was asked repeatedly over the years, and the responses are listed here.)

The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza strip territories, except for several large blocks of settlements which will be annexed to Israel and will not exceed 3% of the size of West Bank. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. The Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza strip. Do you agree or disagree with this item?”

Jewish Sample:

•    45% agree
•    52% disagree

December 2005 (same question, Truman Institute JIPP survey)
•    50% support
•     44% oppose
December 2007 (same question, Truman Institute JIPP survey)
•     44% support
•    54% oppose

June 2008: Truman Institute JIPP

“And of all negotiation tracks to reach a peace settlement Israel is currently involved in, which, in your opinion, is the most promising track with the highest chances to reach a settlement?”

Jewish sample:

• Permanent settlement with Palestinian state within 1967 bordrs: 26%
• Peace, normalization with Syria in return for Golan Heights: 15%
• Comprehensive agreement, Saudi plan, full return of occupied territories: 12%
• No agreement at all: 34%

March 2009
A research study commissioned by One Voice, and developed by peace research scholar Dr. Colin Irwin was conducted by Dahaf Research.

“Israel should withdraw to the 1967 border with adjustment through agreement of equivalent exchange of land”

•    52% of all Israelis responded that this is “essential,” “desirable,” “acceptable” or tolerable”
•    39% considered it unacceptable.

June 2010: Truman Institute (JIPP) – immediately following the flotilla. The same question was asked as above (“The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza strip territories, except for several large blocks of settlements…”). Even at this tense time, the Jewish population split evenly: 44% support this, and 45% are against it.

2007-2010: Geneva Initiative Surveys:

The research conducted by the Geneva Initiative shows opposition to withdrawal to 1967 borders with adjustments during the last few years. In the Geneva research from 2007-2010, just over half the Jewish sample consistently opposes the withdrawal, and roughly 30% support it. Yet, when their surveys ask about the entire package, precisely the opposite trend appears: roughly 54% supports the whole package, and less than 1/3 (about 30%) are opposed in its last published survey, from December 2010.

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In sum, the Jewish Israeli public over the last few years tends to be divided regarding levels of support for the explicit notion of returning to the 67 borders, with land swaps/adjustments. However, when presented as part of a larger package of an agreement rather than as an isolated concept, Israelis mostly support such packages with clear majorities. The Jewish public became generally more hard-line after the mid-2000s, following the unilateral settlement dismantling in Gaza, the subsequent electoral rise of the Hamas and its takeover of Gaza in 2007 (see this comprehensive INSS report for evidence of the shift in attitudes following this phase).

The bottom line is that the notion of a Palestinian state based on the1967 borders, with adjustments, has never been shown to drag down support for a comprehensive agreement – were the leaders of this region serious enough to reach one.