Iran deal: Why did Bibi pick a futile fight in Washington?

If the prime minister knew all along that he wasn’t going to win the battle in Congress, why would he throw AIPAC and American Jewry into such a divisive fight?

President Barack Obama talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office Monday, May 18, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
President Barack Obama talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office Monday, May 18, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

The Israeli prime minister’s proxies and unofficial spokespeople tried their hardest to convince reporters on Wednesday that Benjamin Netanyahu knew all along his chances of blocking the Iran deal in Congress were slim at best. Yet much of the media in Israel is treating the administration’s success in assembling 34 senators to defend a presidential veto as a political defeat for Netanyahu.

“We knew that the agreement would pass but we tried to contain some of its damage,” one of the prime minister’s proxies was quoted as saying in Yedioth Ahronoth. “A majority in the U.S. opposes the deal,” read the front-page headline in Israel Hayom, the free pro-Netanyahu tabloid owned by Sheldon Adelson. Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Dore Gold delivered a similar message on Army Radio, stating, “we weren’t planning on preventing the deal in the first place.”

Did Netanyahu really know he was fighting a losing battle all along? It’s not clear. Some Israeli diplomatic reporters aired their disagreement on the matter Thursday morning on Twitter. Netanyahu personally briefed all of those reporters before their departure to the U.S. some weeks ago, on their way to meetings with American officials. According to Haaretz’s Barak Ravid, Netanyahu told the Israeli journalists at the time that there was “a drift” in the direction of opposing the agreement – making it sound as if it could actually be killed in Congress. Moav Vardi (Channel 10) and Ilil Shahar, however, left with the impression that Bibi knew the odds for victory were tiny.

But if Netanyahu and his advisors actually knew all along that Congress would not be able to block a presidential veto, their game seems far more cynical — throwing AIPAC into a battle it could not win, and putting the Jewish American community in the worst possible corner, forcing them to choose between a president most of them supported and the Israeli government. Not everybody handled the moment very well: Tablet published an editorial comparing the White House to white supremacists, for example. And all this – for what?

Playing the long game or short-sightedness?

One possible explanation is Netanyahu’s hope that a promised “compensation package” the administration offered Israel might grow as a result of the political battle – and partly as a way to win the support of some of the democratic members of Congress who were uncomfortable with the deal. Netanyahu might also have hoped to ensure the administration’s support in confronting possible Palestinian moves in the UN Security Council or other international institutions, since he believes the administration will try to avoid back-to-back confrontations with Israel and its supporters.

Those are more reasonable objectives than undercutting the deal itself, but one might argue that Netanyahu could have had them all – and more – without an open battle with the president. Such confrontations, however, are a characteristic of Netanyahu’s, and he knows how to maximize their political benefits back home. Bibi’s alliance with the Republican Party might have also played a role here. After the long road they’ve traveled together Netanyahu couldn’t just start working with the president and leave his GOP friends hanging.

Barring an Iranian change of heart or a major violation, however, the agreement is a done deal. Contrary to what some Israelis think, the next president, democrat or republican, will not back out of it on his or her own. The major challenge for those opposing the deal – in Israel and the U.S. alike – was the failure to present a reasonable alternative aside from war. That barrier will only become more insurmountable over time. Suppose the next administration does unilaterally back out of the deal. Then what? It will be impossible to assemble a coalition for sanctions again and the Iranians will have no reason to re-negotiate what was already agreed upon. Instead, Tehran will actually get a free hand in resuming its nuclear program – since the other side backed out of the agreement as well.

The fallout back home

The Israel opposition will try to win some domestic political points on the coattails of Netanyahu’s failure in Washington. That doesn’t mean the deal made Bibi any more politically vulnerable, however, at least not for now. Labor leader Isaac Herzog lost much of his credibility on the issue when he moved from supporting the negotiations in February to opposing the deal in July (at one point he even offered to travel to Washington and lobby against it), to avoiding the issue altogether.

But it’s not just Iran. The Israeli opposition is mired in chaos; some in Labor are starting to openly challenge Herzog’s leadership. There is a greater chance that Herzog will join the government than successfully topple it; Yair Lapid and his party are not in any better shape. So the sense in the political system is that the next challenge to Bibi will come from an outsider, and not from one any politician currently serving in the Knesset. A couple of names being tossed around are that of Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai and retired IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.

Ashkenazi, along with the former heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, is said to be among those who stepped in to block Netanyahu’s attempt to activate a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2010. In recently published recordings, former Defense Minister Ehud Barak said it was Ashkenazi, not Mossad head Meir Dagan or intelligence and atomic energy minister Dan Meridor, who opposed the military option most vigorously.

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