This is what an Israeli newspaper claimed. The truth is more nuanced, and sheds light on how difficult it is for international actors to accept Israel’s demands

According to the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, the Spanish foreign minister outlined a new policy in her speech to the UN General Assembly last week. The headline chosen by the newspaper was “Spain recognizes Israel as Jewish homeland”. According to the article’s text, the Spanish minister also argued that “the issue of Palestinian refugees should be solved in such a way that it does not compromise Israel’s current demographic makeup of a Jewish majority.”

If that was an accurate depiction of Spain’s position, it could be an important (and, in my opinion, worrying) harbinger of an international inclination to accept Israeli demands on these topics. However, the truth is more nuanced and fuzzy than that.

The Spanish foreign minister’s full remarks (PDF) were indeed interesting. On the issue of a “Jewish state”, she says (as Ha’aretz almost fully quotes in the main body of the text):

Diplomatic speech tends to be intentionally hedged, and this statement is no exception. It establishes several degrees of separation between the State of Israel and its Jewish character. Firstly, by referring to “the project to create” a Jewish homeland, rather than the homeland itself, it places the Jewishness of the state in a historical context, as a project that can presumably be completed or at least wound down. Secondly, it refers to a “Jewish homeland” rather than a “Jewish state”, indicating that Israel should be a home for the Jews, rather than embrace a character that is internally biased in their favor. Thirdly, it does not say that Israel “is” the Jewish homeland, but that it embodies the project to create one. In other words, it implies that this is one of the elements that define Israel, rather than the exclusive core of its identity.

Admittedly, this formulation is unlikely to satisfy the Palestinians, or anyone who does not have the time or patience for such semantic gymnastics. However, it does point to the elephant in the room: Palestinian citizens in Israel. The Spanish squirming is meant to answer Israel’s demands, without in any way legitimizing the massive discrimination and exclusion of these citizens. This is a trick that many other international players would like to replicate. But it is unlikely to be successful. After...

AP tries to fact-check Abbas’ speech at the UN, and ends up accusing him of insufficient adherence to Israeli talking points, while making a series of embarrassing factual errors itself

Generally, I sympathize with those who ask: “Shouldn’t all stories be ‘fact-check’ stories?” Still, as a frequent reader of Israeli journalism, I should be thankful for small favors, and appreciate the genre’s existence in English-language media. But the only thing worse than not checking the facts, is presuming to do so, while being in error oneself. That is what happened to the Associated Press when it tried to fact-check Mahmoud Abbas’ UN speech.

The intro was inauspicious, to say the least. The AP argued that Abbas “presented a narrative that is disputed by Israel.” The agency then offered “counter-arguments” to some of his assertions. Fact-checkers should, at the very least, understand the definition of “fact.” A fact is not an assertion supported by all sides to a debate (otherwise, fact-checking itself would be superfluous) nor is it an argument with no counterargument (ditto). It is simply an assertion which is true. Unless AP is implying that the Israeli “narrative” is always true (an impression bolstered by the omission of an equivalent fact check for Netanyahu’s speech).

Unsurprisingly, and contrary to their assertion, AP has not managed to find a single “factually incorrect” statement in Abbas’ speech, while making quite a few “factually incorrect” assertions of their own along the way.

Occupation: Abbas said Palestinians live under “the only occupation in the world.” AP argues that other groups say they are also occupied. All of those groups, however, live in areas officially annexed by their oppressor, and are citizens of the state that controls their lives. Palestinians, on the other hand, live under military law and have no citizenship. Israel refuses to take responsibility to them or relinquish control. That is what makes it the only occupation in the world.

Prisoners: Abbas views Palestinians held by Israel as “prisoners of conscience.” AP, in accordance with their bizarre method, “refutes” this by referring to Israel’s view of these prisoners as violent security risks. But what are the facts? According to figures provided by the IDF, excluding traffic offenses, less than half [pdf] of the indictments in Israel’s Military Courts, where Palestinians are tried, are for terrorism charges, even under Israel’s expansive definitions of the term. Many of...

The international mediators scrapped plans to endorse a Jewish state. That was probably a wise choice. Right now, the threat to dissolve the PA, if credible, could be much more significant than moves on Palestinian statehood

The Middle East International Quartet – composed of the US, EU, UN and Russia – issued a statement yesterday, following the Palestinian application for statehood. Initial plans to affirm the 1967 lines as a basis for final borders, and to endorse Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, were scrapped, in a favor of a more process-oriented text.

This was probably a wise choice. The support for 1967 lines is hum-drum enough, having been reaffirmed in numerous international pronouncements, documents and resolutions. Netanyahu and his right-wing allies have tried to make an issue of this over the past year, but as usual, the Israeli prime minister got caught in his own web of manipulation, when it was uncovered that he himself has endorsed such language very recently.

The issue of Israel as a Jewish state is another matter entirely. While generally endorsed by the US, other international actors have been more hesitant. As Roee Ruttenberg explains, this is a problematic step for Palestinians, while having little practical effect on Israel’s actual character, which is, in fact, quite Jewish. Had the Quartet backed this principle in its statement, it would have made it difficult for future Israeli governments to compromise on this point, and thus, would have further reduced the already bleak chances of reaching an agreement.

So, the Quartet just barely implemented the Hippocratic principle: “Do no harm.” Has it done any good? Not really. It has suggested a series of steps, with deadlines attached to each stage, which would supposedly culminate in a final resolution of the conflict by the end of 2012. The Israeli daily Ha’aretz quoted a US official saying that:

If he managed to say this with a straight face, you have to give credit to American diplomatic skills. After all, the Oslo accords set a deadline for final resolution by 1999, or twelve years ago. George W. Bush announced that a Palestinian state would exist and all issues solved by 2005, six years ago. And those are just the most prominent of a pile-up of missed deadlines for negotiations.

Considering that the current Israeli government is intransigent, and the US has checked...

Obama decided there is no point in wasting his time and political resources on Palestine, and he is right. He can’t change Israeli society; no foreign intervention can do that

Obama’s stance regarding the recognition of the Palestinian state, and his strident pro-Israeli tone before the UN have been variously explained as symptoms of the power of the Jewish voters/donors/lobby, or of America’s declining stature and influence in the world (ignoring recent progress on Libya, Al Qaeda and Iraq). But there is a much simpler explanation.

Obama has reverted to the default (i.e. staunchly sympathetic towards Israel) US position, because he realized there is nothing he could do to improve the situation. Therefore, there is no point in wasting his time and political resources on this issue. And he’s right: the US president does not have the power to change the dynamic on Palestine, and he is not to blame for the impasse we face.

What could he have done? Critics say he could have recognized a Palestinian state, and voted according in the Security Council, or pressured Israel more, or offered his own peace plan. But if one runs through the scenarios, it is hard to see how any of these paths could have led to a significantly better result.

If the US administration were to recognize Palestine, this would certainly be a dramatic move, with substantial legal and symbolic consequences. But the US Congress – Republicans and Democrats alike – would do everything in their power to derail this policy. And even if they don’t, it is very hard to see Netanyahu throw away both his ideology and his premiership to follow suit. If the occupation continues, what’s the difference? No wonder many Palestinians are quite skeptical about this path.

What about more pressure on Israel? This is the favorite hobbyhorse of the administration’s critics. Certainly, Obama could have dialed it up many notches. But nowhere near enough to make Netanyhau, or his coalition, change their stripes. Without support from Congress, there are few sanctions the President can apply, and it is not clear that even sanctions would have made the Israeli right budge, or caused its public support to collapse.

Surely, Obama could have presented a peace plan of his own? The idea is appealing as an abstract notion, but one soon gets stuck on the content. Remember that Olmert and Abbas exchanged competing proposals on borders,...

As Israelis rise in social protest, they comfort themselves with the thought that our safety net is at least better than that of the ultra-capitalist US. They are wrong

The unscheduled and unfortunately long hiatus in the Israeli policy myths series coincided with the unprecedented rise of the current social protest movement. This movement has brought the enormous erosion of Israel’s social safety net to the forefront of public discussion. Yet, if anything, Israelis are underestimating how bad things have become. In this, the suddenly topical fourth installment of the series, I will argue that the situation here is now worse than in the United States, which is widely considered the bastion of “leaving thing up to market,” social Darwinist ideology.

First, let us begin with the headline figure. The US spent 17% of all the goods and services it produced in 2007 on government-provided social services. Israel spent just 15.5% on those services. Among OECD members, this puts it seventh from the bottom, squarely beating such countries as Chile, Mexico and Turkey.

Admittedly, this is largely a reflection of much higher spending on healthcare by the US, which does not necessarily lead to better results, and actually includes less coverage than Israel’s universal system. But the overall impression of an immensely weak social safety net, even in comparison to a country with a much worse reputation on this front, is borne out when we look beyond headline figures, into specific elements of the social safety net.

What happens when you’re old? In the United States, the average social security check comes to 1,177$. In Israel, it is a flat 400$ [Heb], which is nowhere near the equivalent in terms of cost of living or average earnings. Medicare actually provides excellent healthcare for all Americans over 65. Israel’s elderly are covered just like everybody else, which means…

What happens when you’re sick? This is where Israel is supposed to come out ahead. And right now, it does. Here, everyone is covered, whereas tens of millions of Americans are uninsured. However, once the provisions of Affordable Care Act (ACA) fully kick in, in 2014 – assuming the law is not thrown out by the Supreme Court – the US will arguably have a better safety net, even in healthcare. Certainly, the countries will be going in completely opposite directions, as Israel’s deductibles and co-payments soar.

What happens...

Matt Yglesias effectively refutes the argument that Netanyahu lacks a coherent strategy:

But I disagree with the following claim:

All of Netanyahu’s predecessors have pursued roughly the same policy. Some of them may have been willing to concede more territory, but not enough to substantially diverge from Netnayahu’s vision of Jewish Israeli dominance, or make a difference for Palestinians. Yet those leaders have managed to avoid regional isolation.

What has changed? First, the Arab spring (and the decades-long democratization of Turkey that preceded it) are making regional governments more responsive to the widespread resentment provoked by Israel’s policies. Second, Netanyahu’s government relies on parties – including Shas, Yisrael Beitenu, and Netanyahu’s own Likud– that owe their success to an electoral strategy of fomenting xenophobia and chauvinism. That entails adopting public stances which further alienate other peoples and governments in the region.

In other words, Netanyahu is willing the pay the price of regional isolation in order to maintain his electoral strategy, rather than his strategy towards the Palestinians. That is a key difference, and that makes it even less likely that he will show any flexibility.

Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, is set to pass (after some convoluted last minute wrangling) today one of the most anti-democratic measures in the country’s history, the so-called “Anti-Boycott Law.” A link to the full text’s translation can be found here.

Simply put, the law seeks to penalize those who call for boycotting Israel, the settlements, or anyone related to the occupation. If a person, for example, calls for a boycott of academic institutions that participate in the occupation, he could be sued in civil court, and ordered to pay compensation. If a company agrees not to purchase products manufactured in the settlements, it could be barred from government contracts. If an NGO joins the global BDS call, it could be stripped of its non-profit status, and compelled to pay taxes as if it was a commercial firm.

This law joins a long and ignominious list of legislative acts that have passed or been suggested in the past few years, that seek to reduce Israelis’ freedom of speech and assembly, and formalize discrimination of Palestinian Israelis. But it is also different from previously enacted legislation. Unlike the segregation law, it goes beyond enshrining an existing practice. And unlike the Nakba law, it will have a significant and immediate practical effect. As of today, a wide range of people and groups who once called for a boycott will cease doing so. The space for debate and discussion in Israeli society will shrink right before our eyes.

Although only a small minority of Israelis have expressed support for BDS (and I am not one of them), their voice has been significant. At the very least, some very prominent cultural figures have called for boycotting the settlements, and now, if they persist, they could be in serious financial trouble. In some ways, the law is actually more effective than applying a criminal sanction, which has to be enforced by overstretched (and skeptical) police and prosecutors, and meet high standards of evidence. Even if the law is eventually thrown out by the High Court of Justice, in the meantime, the very threat of myriad lawsuits by determined settlers and hard right groups is enough to deter many boycott supporters, who do not have the means to conduct expensive legal battles.

This law is outrageous and wrong on so many levels; it is hard to know where to...

To justify draconian and inhumane measures against refugees, the Israeli government claims the country is flooded by work migrants from impoverished countries. The facts do not bear this out, to put it mildly.

In Israel today, there are two classes of immigrants. One is composed of those who come under the Law of Return, which supposedly grants automatic citizenship for Jews and their immediate relatives (the myth surrounding this law will be discussed in the final installment of this series). The second class is composed, well, of everyone else.

How do they fare? Quite badly, in fact. Children who have lived in the country for the majority of their lives face deportation [Hebrew]. A mother of an infant child with Israeli citizenship nonetheless also faces deportation. Getting pregnant will cost you your visa [Hebrew], despite a High Court of Justice ruling that says otherwise (and see upcoming myth #9 on that). And soon, the first Israeli-only kindergartens in the country will be opened.

Refugees fare no better. A deaf Eritrean recently spent almost two years in jail, because his identity could not be verified. Some are imprisoned just because they require medical care, while others are incarcerated [Hebrew] without access to appropriate medical facilities. And the government is doubling down on this policy, building a huge new prison for refugees, with intentionally cramped conditions. Things have gotten so bad, that HIAS – an international Jewish organization working with asylum seekers – has scaled down its cooperation with the Israeli government [Hebrew], following a decision to arrest asylum seekers on the spot if their request is denied.

The myth of the flood

These draconian and inhumane measures are justified by the claim that Israel is flooded by work migrants from impoverished countries, who illegally enter the country and often put forward bogus claims of fleeing from persecution, in order to stay. The actual and potential numbers are so large, it is argued, that a myriad of ill consequences will follow if the tide is not stemmed: wages for low-skilled workers will be depressed, crime will soar, and the nature of the country will be irreversibly altered. The Interior Minister and his top immigration official have raised the stakes to the point of accusing NGOs assisting migrants and refugees of aiming to destroy Israel and Zionism.

The ugliness of this nativist rhetoric,...

Yisrael Aumann won the Nobel Prize in Economics, yet still manages to make no sense on Israeli-Palestinian peace

Professor Yisrael Aumann, an Israeli laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics, delivered on Wednesday a “master class” in the Presidential Conference in Jerusalem, under the title “Peace in the Middle East: A Game Theorist’s Perspective”. The Jerusalem Post devoted an entire article just to Aumann’s presentation, crowning him as “an out-of-the-box thinker with a pronounced though slightly cockeyed sense of humor and a gift for delivering shockers.”

These shockers included praise for Helen Thomas, the Roman destruction of the Jewish Temple in 70 AD, and Obama’s rather obvious argument that the “belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it.” Out of the box, indeed. Yet, despite the lack of creativity, Aumann’s rehashing of right-wing talking points, which his presentation apparently turned out to be, is illuminating in several ways.

Take, for example, the issue of educating Palestinians to support peace. This was one of Aumann’s top priorities:

Israelis have been blasting the Palestinian Authority for not doing enough to stop terrorism since it was founded. In recent years, however, under Abu Mazen’s leadership, it has become increasingly harder to make this argument. The PA has tightened security cooperation with Israel, and has massively clamped down on terrorist cells and organization. This is one of the factors contributing to a sharp decline in Palestinian attacks and Israeli fatalities in recent years.

So, after this excuse has been taken away from them, Israeli governments have had to resurrect the old hobbyhorse of incitement and education. Beyond the hypocrisy, the argument simply makes no sense. What Aumann neglected to mention is that Israel controlled the Palestinian education system, from the start of the occupation in 1967 to the establishment of the PA in 1994, for 27 years. All Palestinians between the ages of 24 and 59 have spent at least some time in Israeli-controlled classrooms, and those between the ages of 35 and 50 have spent their entire time in school under Israeli control.

According to Aumann’s logic, these people – who also happen to dominate the ranks of school teachers and principals, and education ministry officials – should have been strong advocates for peace. Perhaps hate for Israel has more to do with the occupation and Israeli policies than with education?

According to the Jerusalem...

Noam ended his post from yesterday with an interesting sentence: “Without America’s support for it, there would have been no occupation.” It has occurred to me that the US probably does not perceive itself as a supporter of the occupation. So, for the benefit of up-and-coming politicians and diplomats, I have prepared a short test they can take, to see whether they support or oppose the occupation.

Question 1: How often do you talk about the Palestinian issue?

a. Incessantly, even when asked about Peru or Japan.

b. Only when I have something new and substantial to say.

c. Only when I am cornered by a pack of ravenous journalists.

d. What issue?

Score: a – zero points for prioritizing talk over action; b – one point for being serious; c – zero points for evading the issue; d – minus one point for utter callousness.

Question 2: How will you vote in the UN on a Palestinian state?

a. In favor of recognition; then I plan to rest for a decade.

b. I will do everything in my power to avoid this immensely difficult choice.

c. Against recognition. I am part of the moral majority, and will burn down the UN building if the rest of the world votes against me.

d. I have bigger fish to fry.

Score: a – zero points for focusing on pointless symbolism; b – zero points for taking yourself way too seriously; c – minus one point for making no sense; d – one point for having the right priorities.

Question 3: What is your recipe for ending the occupation?

a. More peace talks – it can’t possibly fail.

b. Build institutions for a Palestinian state.

c. Put pressure on Israel to end it.

d. Stop calling it the occupation.

Score: a – really? zero points; b – 0.1 points for at least trying; c – one point for fingering the culprit; d – minus one point for distorting reality.

Question 4: What should policy towards Israel look like?

a. Shower it with unconditional largesse.

b. Demand a partial and temporary settlement freeze.

c. Harshly criticize the occupation and other violations of human rights.

d. Make vague, non-credible threats about sanctions.

Score: a – minus one point for being counterproductive; b – zero points for missing the point; c – one...

Racist attitudes against Arabs are widespread in Israel. Numerous official policies segregate and separate Jews from Palestinians, with a vastly discriminatory effect and intent. Justifications alluding to security needs, or alleging that separation is based on citizenship rather than ethnic origin, do not withstand close scrutiny.

One of the most acrimonious controversies surrounding Israeli policy concerns the accusation that it has created a system of apartheid between Jews and Palestinian in territories under its control. The issue is so sensitive, that some activists have come to refer to the term as “the A-word”.

While bickering over nomenclature is, in my opinion, an unfortunate distraction, the debate on this topic has raised an interesting question. Many of Israel’s defenders angrily reject the accusation of apartheid, claiming that even if there are certain mechanisms of separation between Jews and Palestinians, they are not motivated by racism and do not reflect a racial ideology, unlike the South African regime that was dismantled in 1994.

Obviously, contemporary Israel is different from Apartheid South Africa in too many ways to enumerate. Putting the comparisons aside, is the core argument true? Is separation between Jews and Palestinians motivated by racism or not?

Although Israeli society has not been free from ideas of a biological hierarchy among racial groups, this line of thought has largely been marginal. However, arguments of “cultural” inferiority have gained much more currency. Orientalism – the view of an undefined “East” as lethargic and static in comparison to the West’s dynamism – has been a central feature of Jewish Israeli thought in regards to the Arab Middle East. It has also affected views of Sephardic Jews - those who immigrated to Israel from Middle Eastern countries.

Outright racism against Palestinians and Arabs is quite common and widespread in Israel, and it goes beyond animosity generated by the century-long conflict between the two groups. Three-quarters of Israeli Jewish high school students believe that Arabs are not cultured, uneducated, unclean and violent. 69 percent believe they are not smart. Sadly, these beliefs are at least tolerated by the Israeli Jewish establishment. Racist comments by public officials may be condemned by prominent figures, but the racists remain on the state payroll.

These attitudes have not resulted in separate lunch counters or water fountains. As Israel’s defenders rightly point out, Jews and Palestinians study together in universities and travel on...

Although Israel does face some significant security threats, it is very hard to explain the priorities and decisions of its leadership by the need to address these threats. This is the first part in a series about the top ten myths regarding Israeli policy.

Even some critics of Israeli policy regarding the Palestinians and Arab states would concede that it is motivated by security concerns. Indeed, these policies are often attacked for being excessively focused on security, at the expense of the country’s values and long term interests. Security is the most frequent justification articulated by Israeli leaders in defense of their policies, although its prominence has receded in recent years, as threats such as Palestinian terrorism or the Iranian nuclear programs have become less salient.

Israel does face some significant and real security threats, although their magnitude and probability is often exaggerated. However, it is very hard to explain the priorities and decisions of its leadership by the need to address these threats.

Exhibit one is the ongoing neglect of issues relating to civil defense, emergency preparedness and other measures to protect civilians from harm in case they are attacked. This neglect, despite frequent warnings and exposés, is not congruent with an obsessive focus on security. In several cases (such as the Gaza and Lebanon wars), Israeli governments have been willing to spend billions on a war, putting lives on both sides at great risk, in the name of protecting their people from attack. But the same governments also refused to spend millions on measures that would protect exposed areas from the very attacks the war was meant to end.

Israel’s West Bank policy conveys a similar impression. Few Israelis, let alone outsiders, understand just how much of the country’s military resources are spent on maintaining and defending the settlements (with a non-trivial portion going to cover settler obstructionism of these efforts). In the first decade after the occupation began in 1967, Israel argued that the settlements serve security needs, but this claim has been marginalized since the country’s own High Court of Justice shot it down in the late 1970s.

Israeli policy is not randomly chosen, of course, and it is not motivated by mere malice or spite either (although a climate of anger and hatred can make some policies more extreme). There are a multitude of factors that trump security in...

In the next few weeks, I will write a separate post about each of the top ten myths about Israeli policy, tackling the obfuscation and confusion that often characterize discussions of official Israeli positions and actions, at home and abroad. My top ten list appears below

Inspired by the fascinating series on constitutional myths in the United States (well, fascinating for American politics junkies like myself), by Garret Epps in the Atlantic, I have decided to create my own list of myths. This list refers to myths about current government policy in Israel. It therefore excludes the variety of cultural, social and historical myths surrounding Israel, in order to focus on the obfuscation and confusion that often characterize discussions of official Israeli positions and actions, at home and abroad.

The list is not ranked in any particular order. The various myths have been selected in order to highlight different policy issues, although relations between Jews and Palestinians get a very prominent representation, with half the items in the list. I tried to include myths that are both relatively widespread, and significant in shaping discussions of policy.

In the next few weeks, I will write a separate post about each myth, explaining its origins, significance and the reality it conceals. Here is the list (if you have suggestions for more items, feel free to add them in the comments, adhering to 972′s policy on commenting, of course):

Myth #1: Policy towards Palestinians and Arab states is governed by security concerns.

Myth #2: Separation between Jews and Palestinians is not based on a racist ideology.

Myth #3: In response to a flood of illegal immigrants, the government is working to reduce the number of work migrants.

Myth #4: Israel’s social safety net is better than that in the US.

Myth #5: Israeli Arabs receive fewer benefits because they do not have to serve in the military.

Myth #6: The government is afraid of the settlers and incapable of standing up to them.

Myth #7: The ultra-orthodox reap benefits from disproportionate political influence.

Myth #8: Women’s rights in Israel are largely the same as in other Western countries.

Myth #9: The High Court of Justice defends civil liberties and human rights.

Myth #10: All Jews are encouraged to immigrate to Israel.

Read more in this series: