Yair Lapid (photo: Yotam Ronen / Activestills.org)

The exit-poll results are in, and Noam has an excellent summary of the headline figures. A lot of the attention, as actual results pour in through the night, will be focused on the balance between the blocs. The common wisdom, based on the polls, was that the Right and the ultra-Orthodox will have something between 64-67 (of 120) seats in the Knesset – a solid majority that was supposed to strengthen Netanyahu’s hand in coalition negotiations.

According to the exit polls, that bloc is actually 61-62 seats, bringing it perilously close to losing its majority. This is a surprising result, especially in light of very low voter turnout among Israeli-Palestinian citizens, who rarely vote for the Right. Yet even if the Right and ultra-Orthodox fall to 60 or slightly below, the outcome might be disappointingly similar to what everyone assumed: a Netanyahu-led government, incorporating some centrist parties.

The basic problem is that the Jewish-Zionist parties of the “Left” or “Center” have never been willing to form a coalition with the non-Zionist Arab parties, or even form a minority coalition relying on their votes. Without the Arab parties, there is no chance that the Center-Left can form a government on its own. That automatically weakens its hand in coalition negotiations.

Furthermore, the Jewish-Zionist Center-Left is currently splintered into two major parties (Labor and Yesh Atid, with 17-19 seats each, according to exit polls) and two smaller parties (Meretz and Hatnua, with 6-7 each, according to the exits). Netanyahu can pick off parts of this bloc at his convenience.

The task is made easier by the most surprising result indicated by the exit polls: the rise of Yesh Atid to become second-largest party after Likud-Beitenu. Yesh Atid is a new party, headed by Yair Lapid, a media personality and the son of late journalist and politician Yosef Lapid, who led a similar party to similar results in elections that took place less than a decade ago. As its name suggests (it means “there is a future” in Hebrew), Lapid’s party is, literally, the personification of vapid centrism. The only glue that holds it together is the fact that its future parliamentarians were picked at the sole discretion of their founder and chairman.

Lapid himself, despite running for office (tacitly and explicitly) for almost two years now, has not distinguished himself as a clear voice on public policy. On the two most important issues facing the country – relations with the Palestinians and economic policy – Lapid has evaded taking any tough stances. Indeed, he is famously self-contradictory and vague. He is slightly more strident regarding relations between secular and religious Jews, but even here his solutions are usually mushy and ideally suited for politically convenient foot-dragging and can-kicking.

In other words, Lapid is the ideal partner in Netanyahu’s coalition. The prime minister was never too keen on basing his coalition solely on the Right and the ultra-Orthodox, even if that bloc had done better in the elections. Netanyahu has always preferred larger coalitions, where no single partner, or no single group of crazies from his own Likud, can hold the government hostage. And if there is such a partner, it is better for it to be big and clearly controlled by a person who is not inclined to make much noise or draw lines in the sand.

So Netanyahu and Lapid should get along fine. Likud-Beitenu, Habayit Hayehudi (a hard-right party much strengthened by the elections) and Yesh Atid will have a majority of seats in the Knesset, if the exit polls are correct. To increase stability (did I mention the crazies?), they include might the ultra-Orthodox party Shas, which would probably get along with Lapid just as it grudgingly accepted his father (who was much more strident on secular-religious issues than his son).

What about the Israeli-Palestinians issue? Lapid will probably be the only one in a position to pressure for change on this front. If he is so inclined, he managed to conceal it quite impressively thus far. His party is made up mostly of left-wingers (unlike the crashed-and-burned Kadima, which was half and half). However, if the Israeli-Palestinian issue matters to them, they sure had a funny way of showing it by joining Lapid’s party when almost every other option left of Likud was more promising.

It is likely that this hastily-cobbled team, with little shared background, history or values, will quickly dissolve. This is the story of all of Yesh Atid’s predecessors, occupying the spot of Jewish-Zionist secular new party (and there have been many of them, including the one headed by Lapid’s own father). However, it is unlikely to be over the Palestinian issue, and unlikely to affect public policy in any significant way.

Let’s hope for more surprises, then.

Following up on my post regarding the two-state solution (and some of the comments to that post), I would like to put forth a more general and formal version of my argument.

Let’s say that you are stridently opposed to the idea of one state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean – one that would be undemocratic, and based on the explicit, formal and institutionalized supremacy of the (soon-to-be) Jewish minority within such a state. Let’s also say that you reject a democratic and egalitarian one-state solution, which would not – in your opinion – be compatible with the Jewish right for national self-determination. What do you do?

That depends on your assessment regarding the Palestinian position. As I see it, there are three possibilities for understanding the Palestinians’ stand.

First, you may believe that the Palestinians will reject any solution in which the state of Israel continues to exist in anything resembling its current form. If that is what you think, the solution is clear: dismantle the vast majority of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and retreat to lines of contiguous Israeli territory.

Such a solution would be good for security, as it does not constrict the IDF’s operational leeway in any way, and indeed it would release precious resources currently directed to defending these settlements. It would show the world Israel is committed to a reasonable solution, and would allow the country to retain both its Jewish and (formally) democratic character. Even the economic cost would be limited, as not all that many settlers live in those isolated settlements. It would entail a political rift with the hard right, but then again, the hard right supports a non-democratic one-state solution, so it is hard to see how friction with it can be avoided, if you stick to your own positions.

Second, you may believe that the Palestinians will only accept a solution in which they get 98 percent of West Bank. In this case, you will just give them what they want. You get to avoid the one-state non-democratic nightmare you are so concerned about, peace with the Palestinians, and widespread international support, probably covering most of the cost of this mass evacuation.

Third, you may believe that the Palestinians will accept a lot less than 98 percent, perhaps 94 percent (as Olmert suggested), or even less than that. In that case, it is only a matter of holding out until they cave. How long will you wait? Ten years? 20? 45? Eventually, you may conclude that Palestinians will not cave after all, or you will just grow impatient of living in your one-state, non-democratic nightmare for so long, that you will decide those few percentage of the West Bank are just not worth the trouble.

This bare-bones analysis clearly shows that, no matter what their beliefs about Palestinians’ aims and desires, the policy of Israel’s leaders does not accord with their stated support for a two-state solution or for a democratic and Jewish state. Whether they like to admit it or not (even to themselves), the leaders of all of Israel’s major parties support a non-democratic, one-state solution, based on Jewish supremacy.

Related:
In controversy over Peres remarks, Israeli ‘center-left’ pays lip service to two-state solution
+972 Magazine elections coverage

During the current election campaign, two of the most popular party leaders identified with the center-left have done almost everything in their power to avoid saying anything left-sounding on the Palestinian topic. Yair Lapid, leader (and personification) of Yesh Atid, and Shelly Yechimovitch, head of the Labor party, have often tried to position themselves to the right of this issue (Yachimovitch saying nice things about settlements, Lapid opposing division of Jerusalem and favoring a free hand for the IDF).

Three weeks before the elections, the past few days have witnessed a rare break in this trend. The occasion was a speech by the supposedly non-political head of state, President Shimon Peres, before Israeli ambassadors to foreign nations. Peres presented his well-known position, that the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, is willing and able to make the concessions necessary for an agreement on a two-state solution with Israel. He criticized statements to the contrary, made by Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Foreign Minister Lieberman (both of the Likud-Beitenu party).

His message apparently resonated with the audience who, later in the same conference, complained that defending Israel abroad is made more difficult by the government’s intransigent positions and actions (a point reaffirmed by a recent think tank report). They were promptly told by Israeli National Security Advisor Yaakov Amidror to keep their opinions to themselves or resign and run for political office.

The president got only a slightly milder treatment. Likud-Beitenu issued a statement expressing disappointment in the president, blasting him for being “disconnected,” causing damage to Israel’s image abroad, and calling Abbas a “peace refusenik.”

Lapid and Yachimovitch could have settled for defending the popular president, an octogenarian who in two-thirds of a century of political activity has gone from defense-establishment hawk to hated symbol of the left to quintessential consensus figure and elder statesman. Instead, they both chose to combine their spirited rejection of the attacks on Peres with a relatively strong defense of the two-state solution, arguing that it is the only Zionist solution with a national consensus behind it.

The latter point is confirmed by a recent poll, showing a majority support for a two-state solution – including the division of Jerusalem – among the general public, and even among more than 50 percent of right-wing Likud-Beitenu and HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) voters. Indeed, it may explain the response of Yachimovich and Lapid, 90 percent of whose voters support this solution.

Yet the two-state position (tepidly supported by Netanyahu as well) was not the main point of contention in the uproar over Peres’ remarks. Right-wing ire was raised by the contention that Abbas, the Palestinian leader, was a genuine partner for peace talks.

That is the crux of the matter. The real debate among Israel’s major parties is not about the two-state solution. It is about how to best avoid it. Peres, Lapid, Yachimovich and Israel’s ambassadors all prefer the method of endless negotiations, backed by ceaseless proclamations of good faith and willingness to make concessions, which was government policy for most of the last two decades (including Peres’ tenure as prime minister in 1995-1996). The current version of Likud, on the other hand, believes that the best way to achieve pretty much the same goal is to constantly decry any credible Palestinian interlocutor as a fraud.

Abbas is a problem for them because it is hard to pin this label on him. Under his leadership, the Palestinians have boosted security cooperation with Israel, and he has made unprecedented remarks regarding concessions on Palestinian refugees’ right of return, and on recognizing Israel as a Jewish state.

In response, Lieberman, when he was still Israel’s Diplomat-in-Chief, called Abbas “a liar, a coward and a weakling,” accusing him of “diplomatic terror” (which is apparently “more serious” than “conventional terror”) for harshly criticizing Israel, promoting an economic boycott of the settlements, and trying to gain recognition for a Palestinian state  in the UN.

The weakness of these charges exposes the precarious position of the current Israeli government (which, nonetheless, has suffered very little internationally for it). Yet is the opposition any better? Yachimovich and Lapid, as mentioned, are trying to stir clear of this topic, except when they need  to show their base they haven’t gone completely off the deep end, as had happened following the attack on Peres.

But even Tzipi Livni, the one leader of the “center-left” bloc who has focused her campaign on negotiations with the Palestinians, is not really credible on this issue. After all, we have now had nearly two decades of negotiations with the Palestinians, with the last round (under the government of Ehud Olmert, in 2008) involving Livni herself as foreign minister.

These negotiations have made it clear that Palestinian leaders understand that the hope of a mass return of Palestinian refugees to Israel is unrealistic. But they have also shown that Israeli governments, of all political stripes, do not show the same realism regarding the second core issue of borders, including in and around Jerusalem.

On this issue, the offer that has been labeled the most “generous” by an Israeli leader was made by Olmert in 2008, included the annexation of 6.4 percent of the West Bank to Israel (with land swaps in other places to compensate for that territory). That proposal, while entailing the eviction of many settlements, would have kept in place towns such as Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel, slicing the West Bank into several isolated enclaves, making any Palestinian state completely non-viable.

Olmert’s offer came on the heels of a Palestinian proposal which suggested annexing 1.9 percent of the West Bank to Israel, keeping in place 63 percent of the settler population, while calling for the eviction of the large settlements that sit at the heart of Palestinian territory.

That is the real issue at stake. Not the two-state solution, nor Abbas’ character as a potential partner for peace. It is a bit more than 4 percent of the West Bank, settled by less than 3 percent of Israel’s population, and necessary for the making of a viable Palestinian state. This is the 4 percent that Livni is not willing to give up (she even thought that Olmert’s offer went too far), not to mention Lapid or Yachimovich.

If the choice is between that 4 percent of territory or a one-state solution based on Jewish supremacy (the status-quo ante), they prefer the latter. As long as that is the case, their main contention with the right is, and will remain, over diplomatic tactics rather than substance.

In response, Israeli Education Minister Gideon Saar (Likud) argued that “[o]ur connection to Ariel is at least as strong as the UK’s connection to the Falkland Islands.” This comparison is quite apt because Ariel, like the Falklands, is the product of a colonial enterprise, meant to place a metropolitan population amidst a weaker people.

Furthermore, Ariel and the Falklands are both islands. Whereas the Falklands are surrounded by an ocean of water, Ariel is surrounded by Palestinians. It is at the very heart of the West Bank with very little geographic contiguity with Jewish areas of residence inside the Green Line, or even with other settlements in the West Bank. That is why any map that attempts to include it as part of Israel within a two-state solution ends up looking like it was drawn by a cubist painter.

There are distinctions, of course. Most importantly, the other claimant for sovereignty over the Falklands – Argentina – is a sovereign and independent nation. The Palestinians, who have been uprooted to make room for Ariel, are a stateless people living on lands inhabited by them for generations, kept in this position by the very Israeli power that founded and recognized the “university” in Ariel.

Perhaps the most revealing part of this comparison is that Saar, like many of my compatriots, probably sees very little difference between the actual human beings that surround Ariel and want it gone, and the indifferent seawater that surround the Falklands on every side. That might be a greater obstacle to peace than the settlement itself.

The headline result of the upcoming elections in Israel, as Noam Sheizaf has thoroughly documented, is not in doubt. Benjamin Netanyahu will continue as Israel’s prime minister for another term, and will strive to maintain his policy of status quo in every area of policy.

Nonetheless, there are at least two aspects of uncertainty in these elections. First, the potential for more significant changes in areas not related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (such as economic policy or secular-religious relations). Second, these election results could shape the dynamics of the following elections, in which a different outcome is certainly possible (especially considering the incredible volatility of Israeli politics over the past two decades).

To understand these elements of uncertainty, one must examine the different scenarios for post-elections coalition formation. Netanyahu will win, but like all of Israel’s previous prime ministers, his party will not have enough seats to form a government on its own.

The most natural composition of a Likud-led coalition would be what Noam has labeled the right-Orthodox bloc, which will almost certainly hold a majority in the next Knesset. Netanyahu has been reluctant to rely on this formation exclusively, which has brought him down for the slightest of compromises in his first premiership in the 1990s. But having this option would strengthen his hand in discussions with other potential partners.

Right now, the greatest threat for this scenario comes from two tiny parties, struggling to gain enough votes to reach the threshold necessary to get seats in the Knesset.

Am Shalem is an unconventional and hard-to-classify party, a splinter of the ultra-orthodox Shas party, which is nonetheless running hard against current ultra-Orthodox leadership, arguing for modernization in this community. It is likely to draw the majority of its votes from the right-Orthodox bloc, yet it is hard to envisage its participation in a coalition which includes the very parties it is running against.

The second tiny party is Otzma LeYisrael, a far-right party. It will take all its votes from the right-Orthodox block, but its prospects of joining the coalition are unclear. Netanyahu might balk at relying on such rabid extremists, and they could actually prefer the opposition, where they would not be tainted by compromise and could snipe at their slightly-less-hard-right colleagues at Likud-Beitenu and Habayit Hayehudi, helping them to grow in the next elections.

Right now, these two tiny parties seem unlikely to impair the right-Orthodox majority, which is poised to gain at least 64 (of 120) seats without them, according to +972’s Poll Tracker. However, when it comes to tiny parties, especially new ones such as these, the polls are structurally incapable of properly assessing their strength. Even the best polls have a margin of error of at least 3 percent, whereas these parties are struggling to get less than that.

Furthermore, the polls themselves may play a role in the result, as voters strategically wait to see if these parties can even pass the minimal threshold of 2 percent to get seats in the Knesset before deciding whether to vote for them. Indeed, this may be the main hindrance these parties face, as their message seems to be resonating with many voters. A late surge in the polls, even an erroneous one, could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and vice versa.

What happens if Netanyahu is denied the option of forming a stable right-Orthodox coalition, thereby greatly strengthening the bargaining position of potential partners outside the bloc? What would be his path of least resistance?

Hatnua, the dovish sui generis party of former foreign minister Tzipi Livni, will probably be at the bottom of his list. Despite being a former member of Likud, Netanyahu’s own party, Livni has positioned herself as the champion of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians, which would involve significant territorial concessions. Nothing could be further from Netanyahu’s mind. Livni, who has given up the prime minister’s seat in the past to maintain her principles, is unlikely to be tempted to give them up for the much more junior position that Netanyahu might offer in her return.

Yesh Atid, another sui generis party headed by political neophyte and media personality Yair Lapid, is a much more comfortable partner for Netanyahu. It will certainly not give him any headaches on the Palestinian issue. However, Lapid has promoted himself as the champion of the overburdened Jewish-secular middle class. The emblematic issues of recruiting the ultra-Orthodox to the military and getting them from the Yeshivas to the labor market are an important part of his political brand. If he insists on them, it might make him incompatible with the ultra-Orthodox parties – an essential partner for Netanyahu. If he folds on these issues, he would be the ideal partner.

The Labor Party presents a more complicated picture. On the one hand, its leader, Shelly Yachimovich, seems to be the best fit for Netanyahu. She has prioritized neither the Palestinian issue (on which she is much more to the right than Labor’s traditional positions) nor the religious-secular fissure.

Instead, her obsession is with economic policy, where she wants to significantly increase spending on social programs and increase taxes on the wealthy. Netanyahu, despite his neoliberal inclinations, has proven flexible on these issues, and he could certainly work on them with Yachimovich who is actually much more pragmatic than her firebrand image, and much more in tune on this issue with many Likud voters and backbenchers than Netanyahu himself.

However, unlike Lapid and Livni’s parties, which are likely to follow their leaders quite blindly, Labor is anything but sui generis. As Israel’s oldest party, by some counts, it is famously patricidal towards its leaders, and could as easily turn matricidal towards the second woman leader in its history (just as it did for its first, Golda Meir, caving to protests following the disastrous Yom Kippur War).

Already, Yachimovich’s right turn on the Palestinian issue is producing serious grumbles in the ranks. Most dissenters have chosen to ditch the party altogether for Livni, but enough have remained to make trouble for her and Netanyahu, should a coalition be formed. That is precisely what they did in the current Knesset when they drove out Labor’s previous leader, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, after he formed a coalition with Likud. Ironically, in that round, Yachimovich was one of the dissenters, and refused to sit in Netanyahu’s government, certainly not an auspicious omen for a Likud-Labor coalition re-make.

So, Netanyahu will certainly be prime minister, but the stability of his second term will be far less certain. A lot depends on two tiny parties, whose support is nearly impossible to estimate in advance, along with the major parties of the center-left bloc, all of which are running on untested platforms. An internally divided and discordant coalition could mean an opportunity for whomever remains in opposition, and could offer a compelling alternative to dissatisfied Israeli voters in the next elections.

Read more: 
The rise of the extreme right is the story of the Israeli elections
What’s the deal with Shelly Yachimovich?

Two recent incidents have brought attention to the issue of attacks on Palestinian civilians by Jewish extremists. On Thursday, a firebomb was thrown at a Palestinian taxi in the West Bank, injuring six people, one of them seriously. Later the same day, three Palestinian youth were assaulted in a “lynch” committed by dozens of Jewish youth in West Jerusalem, while hundreds stood by without intervening.

Both incidents have sparked widespread condemnation; and the firebomb attack has been labeled a terrorist attack by both Israeli and American officials. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even called Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and promised him that Israel will catch the perpetrators of this attack.

Yet this kind of incident is hardly a new development. Last year, the Jerusalem Post warned that Jewish terrorism was “gaining steam.” The article argued that a serious response to this problem is “long overdue,” pointing to several years of warnings by Israeli security officials on this issue.

Despite this, law enforcement on Jewish extremists has remained highly deficient. According to information gathered by the Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din, 85 percent of police investigations fail when it comes to violent crimes committed by settlers against Palestinians. And Netanyahu’s promise to catch the perpetrators of the recent firebomb attack sounds all the more dubious, considering Israel’s record of breaking similar promises when it comes to the spate of mosque arsons which have plagued the West Bank in recent years.

Even when perpetrators are caught, their treatment leaves a lot to be desired. The penalties imposed by courts tend to be severe when it comes to the most violent crimes. However, Israeli presidents over the years have used their pardon powers to mitigate the punishment of Jewish extremists. To illustrate the magnitude of this problem, I have listed the most prominent cases from the last 30 years:

-The infamous Jewish Underground, active in the 1980s, was responsible for numerous attacks in which three innocent Palestinian civilians were killed and dozens were injured. Fifteen members of this terrorist group were convicted. Three of them received life sentences, but were released after seven years when President Chaim Herzog, of the Labor Party, commuted their sentences.

-Allan Goodman, who murdered a Palestinian in Jerusalem in 1982, served less than 16 years in prison, after his life sentence was commuted.

-Nir Efroni murdered a Palestinian-Israeli gas attendant in Zichron Yaakov in 1984. He and his partner stabbed their victim multiple times and returned to stab him again when they noticed he had not yet died. Efroni was caught only six years later, after his partner ratted him out, and served just 13 years.

-David Ben Shimol spent only 11 years in prison for firing a rocket on a commuter bus in 1984 that killed one Palestinian and injured dozens.

-Danny Eisenmann, Gill Fuchs and Michal Hillel served 11, nine and five years respectively for murdering a Palestinian cab driver in 1985.

-Nachson Wals served just 8 years in prison for killing a Palestinian in 1991.

-In 1992, Kahanist youth threw a grenade in a Jerusalem market, killing one Palestinian and injuring dozens. They received sentences ranging from 5-15 years, of which they served 7-9.

-Daniel Morali served just 13 years for killing a Palestinian truck driver in 1994.

To recap, Israel is quick to condemn and promise the capture of violent Jewish extremists. These promises are often broken, most investigations fail, and the penalties for those who do get caught often end up being woefully inadequate. Don’t be surprised if the problem only gets worse.

One of the growing signs of pessimism regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the belief of many activists that only external pressure on Israel can lead to a just solution. This is the premise of a wide spectrum of efforts, from those calling for mild pressure and diplomatic initiatives, to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The latter often points to the example of South Africa, where sanctions and international isolation contributed to the demise of the Apartheid regime.

Beyond the questions of principle and justice, which are certainly relevant, one must also address the issue of efficacy. Do we have any reason to believe that international pressure on Israel, let alone sanctions, is at all likely? There is an abundance of evidence that points to an emphatically negative answer.

The most important international actor today is, of course, the United States. That country also happens to be Israel’s staunchest ally. Instead of growing more critical of the occupation as it nears the end of its first half century, Washington is ever less likely to oppose Israel’s policies, let alone pressure its government. After some half-hearted attempts at (very mild) pressure during the beginning of his term, the Obama administration has quickly retreated to a position of unquestioning support, lavishing Israel with aid and cooperation. While Washington’s positions on the Palestinian issue have not really changed, using its leverage against Israel in any way is not really on the agenda.

So maybe Europe is the answer? Although not as important as the United States, Europeans’ extensive commercial and cultural ties with Israel provide them with significant tools to apply pressure, if they choose. Certainly, European countries have been far more willing to harshly condemn Israel’s actions and policies than recent American administrations.

But over the past two decades (at least) they have clearly made a strategic choice to move in the opposite direction. Instead of holding relations with Israel hostage to progress on the Palestinian issue, they have decided to largely plough ahead with strengthening ties. Their hope is that by being friendlier to Israel, they can exert more influence and gain the ear of its government. As Dr. Claire Spencer wrote (PDF) for the Israeli European Policy Network:

The approach has been to progressively normalise relations with Israel, using a succession of bilateral agreements, such as the lifting of tariffs on 95% of Israeli exports of processed goods in May 2008 and the Common Aviation Area approved by the European Parliament in February 2009 (notably in the period since the Gaza conflict).

Despite the clear failure of this approach, Europe is showing no signs of doubt or reversing course. On the contrary: the outbreak of the second Intifada, the collapse of peace talks, and massive Palestinian civilian casualties (along with many Israeli ones, as well), have hardly slowly down this process. Take this passage from an EU document on cooperation with Israel (PDF):

Since  1996 when it joined the 4th Research Framework Programme (FP4), Israel has been one of  only two non-European countries fully associated to the EU’s research funding  programmes and over time has constantly increased its participation and success rate in obtaining grants. Under the Sixth Research Framework Programme (FP6 – 2002-2006) Israeli research bodies participated in over 600 research projects in consortia with their European counterparts. The EU is now Israel’s second biggest source of research funding.

So, instead of weakening ties with Israel, or even holding back, the European Union has continued to forcefully advance them, even giving Israel preferential treatment. In 2009, after the Gaza war, the EU did halt further progress for a while (although not completely, as Dr. Spencer’s words above indicate). Yet, despite the election of the hardline Netanyahu government, and its ever more radical settlement policy, in 2010 European nations supported Israel’s accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the EU has recently decided to move ahead with further expansion of bilateral ties. Support for this move was unanimous among all EU ministers.

Other international actors either have little influence, or carry responsibility for human rights violations far worse than the occupation. As the divestment and boycott elements of the BDS campaign suggest, many activists pin their hopes on the engagement of ordinary people who will refuse to buy Israeli goods or pressure investment funds to sell their holding in Israeli companies. Yet, despite some isolated successes, especially in the cultural field, these efforts have made little more headway than the route of sanctions. Israel’s economy is too diversified and low-profile to be seriously affected by such diffuse actions.

So, regardless of its merits, the effort to change Israeli policy from without seems hopeless. One can condemn or applaud the international community on its approach to Israel, but it is hard to deny this policy has gone in the opposite direction from pressure and sanctions, and shows no indications of changing any time soon. Although outside actors may have a role to play, the only realistic scenario is for them to play an auxiliary part in a process of change that must come from either Israelis or Palestinians or both.

1. Does Iran intend to develop a nuclear weapon?

Probably yes. Iran (unlike Israel) has signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which bars all signatories from developing nuclear weapons, aside from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. But Tehran has already violated its commitments under the NPT, and at least two countries (Iraq and North Korea) have developed or come near to developing nuclear weapons after signing the NPT. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has issued a religious decree, a Fatwa, ruling that possessing or using nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam. Yet this ruling does not seem to exclude the development of a nuclear breakout capability, where a country could quickly construct a nuclear warhead if it felt the need for it (e.g. Japan). Despite Iranian denials, this seems to be the main aim of their Uranium enrichment program, not to mention work they may have done on developing a nuclear warhead.

2. Can they do it?

Probably yes. Building a nuclear weapon is an immensely difficult and expensive undertaking, requiring the gradual accumulation of complex technical skills. This is part of the reason why predictions about Iran’s imminent possession of such weapons have been disproven again and again over the past two decades.  Yet over that period, Iran has made progress towards that goal, albeit much more slowly than Western intelligence has estimated. If North Korea could do it, it is certainly possible for Iran, although it will have to decide at each point whether it is willing to invest the necessary resources and efforts.

3. Will they launch a nuclear attack on Israel or other countries?

Probably not. Iran has certainly threatened Israel many times, and has not disguised its objection to the country’s very existence. Many argue that a country run by fundamentalist clerics cannot be trusted to operate on a rational basis: its leadership may decide that a divine imperative to destroy Israel overrules any other consideration. But this argument is belied by the conduct of Iranian policy since the Islamic Republic was formed, almost a quarter of a century ago. After an initial period of working to spread Islamic revolution, Tehran has adopted a largely pragmatic approach to foreign relations. It has shown no sign of being willing to countenance the country’s entire annihilation, which would surely follow if they launch a nuclear attack on Israel. It is highly unlikely that Iranian clerics believe the religious duty to fight Israel trumps their duty to avoid the death of tens of millions of Muslims.

4. So is there a problem if they get a nuclear weapon?

Yes. Presumably, the main reason Iran wants to have a nuclear weapon, or nuclear breakout capacity, is to deter its enemies, mainly Israel and the United States, from attacking in retaliation for its sponsorship of terrorism and subversion outside its borders. Right now, Iran has been spared an attack due its conventional deterrence capability, mainly ballistic missiles which could be armed with chemical warheads; and its ability to initiate massive terror attacks abroad. Nuclear deterrence could expand Iran’s freedom of action. In response, neighbors (such as Saudi Arabia) could decide they must also achieve nuclear military capability, to counter-deter Iran from attacking or subverting their regimes. This could cause a nuclear arms race, and if it spreads, undermine the NPT on a global scale. While this scenario is certainly possible, it seems unlikely. So far, the nuclear capacities possessed by Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have not caused such a global domino effect.

5. Can anything stop them, short of a military strike?

Probably yes. As part of the pressure to curb its nuclear program, the international community has imposed severe sanctions on Iran, which have had major effects on the country. In addition, various incentives have been offered to Iran, if it drops its nuclear efforts.  This can ultimately push the regime to decide that the costs of the program outweigh its potential benefits. But so far, neither carrots nor sticks have worked. Even if they do, it would be difficult (though not impossible) to verify that Iran is sticking to its commitments. It would also be impossible to make Iranian scientists and technicians unlearn the knowledge they have accumulated, allowing them to recreate the program at a later point, even if physical installations are dismantled.

6. Will a military strike stop them from getting the weapon?

No. This is precisely for the same reason that non-military means have limited efficacy: an attack can only target physical installations; it cannot erase the knowledge accumulated by Iranian experts, which is the most critical and difficult-to-achieve element of a nuclear weapons’ program (that is probably the reason these experts have been targeted for assassination in recent years). General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has argued that at best, an Israel strike could delay the Iranian nuclear program for a few years.

Proponents of the attack, like Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, are not really disputing this point. Instead, they argue that the delay will buy enough time to allow the toppling of the regime. This is quite a dubious claim. There is no reason to believe the Iranian regime is closer to collapse today than it has been at any point since 1979. An attack might actually strengthen it, by causing Iranians to rally around the flag against a perceived foreign aggressor. Even the regime falls, it is unclear whether its successor would be any less interested in a program, which was initiated under the Shah, or any less dangerous than the Islamic Republic.

7. Is there a significant downside to a military strike?

Yes. The price will be paid mostly by ordinary Israelis, who could be the target of Iranian retaliation through missile attacks and Iranian-sponsored terrorism. Hundreds could die, thousands might be injured, and the country’s economy could suffer a devastating blow. If neighboring countries under Iranian influence, such as Syria and Lebanon, are drawn into this conflict, it could end up enflaming a regional escalation, with unpredictable consequences for the stability of many fragile regimes. Furthermore, an attack could cause an international backlash, undermining support for the sanctions, and strengthening the regime’s hand (and its ability to pursue the nuclear weapons program) both internally and externally.

8. So, is anybody in favor a strike?

Yes. As mentioned above, Israeli Defense Minister Barak is supporter and so is the Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu. They are supported by a lot of American neo-cons, including former Republican presidential candidate, Senator John McCain, who even offered a musical tribute on the topic, riffing of the Beach Boys song ‘Barbara Ann’.

9. If the Prime Minister and Defense Minister are for the strike, can anyone stop them?

Probably yes. The Obama Administration is opposed to the strike, and as General Dempsey’s comment implies, its position is largely supported by the American defense establishment. But it has also made it pretty clear that the US will not veto a strike if Israel is determined to go ahead. The real veto point resides within the Israeli system, which has shown a remarkably high level of opposition for our normally militant and offensive-minded nation. Security and military chiefs, both past and present, are largely opposed; and so are many prominent cabinet members, President Shimon Peres, and opposition leader Shaul Mofaz (who is also former IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister). Public opinion is at best split on the topic, and skeptical of a solo Israeli operation. If these sentiments persist, opponents of military action might actually have the upper hand, for once.

I provide a breakdown of the structure of citizenship in Israel and the different sectors of the population under Israeli control and how the law applies to them.  It’s a system in which there is no single rule of law and in which discrimination and injustice are part and parcel of the legal structure.

The High Court of Justice has upheld a controversial procedure governing investigations into allegations of abuse and torture against employees of Israel’s General Security Service, better known as the Shin Bet. According to this procedure, all complaints, usually filed by Palestinians who the Shin Bet detained and interrogated on suspicion of terrorism, are first examined by a Shin Bet official, working under the professional supervision of the Attorney General’s Office. This examination includes interviews with the complainants and the accused agents and review of relevant documentation. The case can proceed to a full criminal investigation only if this official rules that there are grounds to do so: if he finds no such grounds, the case is closed.

This procedure has been strongly criticized by human rights organizations, which submitted the petition that was rejected yesterday. The petition was drafted and litigated by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), joined by more than a dozen Palestinian complainants, and many Israeli human rights organizations.

The petition and the court ruling (see here for the full text in Hebrew) deal with numerous issues of legal interpretation and organizational structure. However, the most relevant fact may actually be a number: zero. That is the number of complaints that resulted in a criminal investigation, out of about 600 monitored by PCATI. Zero is not the number of convictions, nor even the number of indictments. It is the number of cases that were deemed worthy of even opening a professional criminal investigation by an external body. This record is even worse than that of the flawed mechanism of accountability regarding complaints against settlers or IDF soldiers.

The High Court ruling does not seriously address the remarkable outcome of the Shin Bet’s procedure. After plowing through some 26 pages of convoluted legalese, its basic argument appears to be that the system of investigating complaints against the Shin Bet is “evolving,” and the court does not see fit to interject itself into this evolutionary process. It argues that the Shin Bet has improved on its appalling standards of opacity and unaccountability since the 1980s, and chooses to believe the state’s promises that various additional improvements are in the works.

The court also suggested that the state respond within a month to individual petitioners’ requests to reconsider the Shin Bet’s decision not to open an investigation into their complaints. PCATI, in response, criticized the court’s refusal to label Shin Bet investigation methods as “torture” (which, under international law, would have compelled a criminal investigation in all such cases), but expressed hope that the decision regarding individual complainants might lead to proper legal recourse in those cases. Clearly, the track record on this issue is not encouraging.

Postscript: The English language story on the ruling by Haaretz omits the fact that no criminal investigation has been opened out of 600 cases, and does not include PCATI’s response to the ruling. Both pieces of information appear in the Hebrew version of the same article. This is not the first time something like this has happened.